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This dissertation consists in three chapters, each making a distinct contribution.
Chapter 1 empirically tests classic and new Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle in
an innovative way. Findings suggest that government debt is significant and
economically relevant for UIP puzzles estimation.
Chapter 2 shows that a class of macroeconomic models reproduce the UIP puz-
zle under a standard parametrization and adding convenience yields exogenous
dynamics.
Chapter 3 is a theoretical model that links financial crises to the election of
populists parties, matching empirical evidence from Europe.
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The dissertation consists in three Chapters.
Chapter 1 studies how government debt variables impact estimates of the classic
and new UIP puzzles for quarterly data between 2000 and 2020 of 6 developed
countries in relation to the United States. I estimate country-pair VECMs to
model cointegration relations between debt variables, price differences, interest
rates differences and nominal exchange rate.
I compare this framework with one without debt variables following Engel (2016)
using quarterly data between 1979 and 2020. In the framework without debt, I
don’t find the new UIP puzzle while in the framework with debt, I do find it.
Government debt variables are significant and alter the sign of comovements
between difference in interest rates and far-ahead ex-post and ex-ante excess
currency returns. The magnitude of the effect is economically relevant.
Government debts coefficients cannot be uniquely associated with convenience
yield story.
Production based models with Long Run Risks and recursive preferences can-
not replicate the classic Uncovered Interest Parity Puzzle. Chapter 2 augments
a EZ-BKK model with government bonds as exogenous processes so that they
bring time-varying convenience yields. Permanent shocks to bonds replicate
the UIP puzzle when they are positively correlated to long-run news under a
standard parametrization. Temporary shocks to bonds may replicate the UIP
puzzle if the volatility of short term shock is close to two times a standard
parametrization, without needing the positive correlation with long-run news.
Chapter 3. Financial crises often seem to be associated with populism, al-
though the populist banking policies introduced to address such crises are far
from homogenous. This apparent paradox – a sort of “sight-unseen consensus”
– suggests that specific economic drivers coupled with general psychological
components can explain populist consensus. We propose a model of populist
consensus, which we term “democratic rioting”, in which individuals’ decisions
to support or resist a specific populist bailout policy after a financial crisis are
heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics. Those dynamics, in turn,
are driven by general, non-banking-related motivations, such as anti-elite sen-
timents. In a multiple equilibria setting, the more individuals are unhappy
for general economic and/or psychological reasons, the more likely they are to
support myopic and redistributive populist banking policies rather than long-
sighted public interventions.
1
1 Chapter 1. Exchange Rates and Government
Debt.
1.1 Introduction
Exchange rates have been studied for decades with different angles: from deter-
mination of the levels for demand of traded goods ( based on Dornbusch (1976)
and Mundell-Fleming) to resolution of puzzles (see review essays by Engel (1996,
2014) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Ishtoki and Mukhin (2017) ).
Two of the puzzles are referred to as the uncovered interest parity (UIP) , both
in classic and new form. The classic UIP puzzle finds that there is positive cor-
relation between high interest rate countries and excess currency returns. This
happens at frequencies between six or more hours1 and quarters for low infla-
tion countries and does not happen for long term bonds (Chinn and Meredith
(2004)).
The new UIP puzzle has been documented by Engel (2016) and Valchev(2020):
after an initial positive correlation, there is a reversal between interest rates and
excess currency returns. Part of the literature considers the role of liquidity or
convenience into play in order to explain these puzzles. Intuitively, short-term
bonds that are safe and liquid give an additional benefit to interest rate returns:
counting this effect, the two puzzles may be jointly explained theoretically. In-
deed, high value from liquidity is referred as high convenience yield of a bond
and it may vary depending on the demand and supply of safe and liquid gov-
ernment bonds.
This paper studies the interaction of the classic and new UIP puzzle with gov-
ernment debts for each of G6 countries with the US. The motivation comes
from two intuitions. First, if liquidity plays a role in explaining exchange rate
puzzles, it is useful to incorporate a broad proxy for it in our estimation of the
puzzles. Second, a decent and ready available proxy for every country is the
amount of government debt. On top of these, another motivation is to check
for possible long term relations between fundamentals and government debt in
order to correctly estimate the UIP puzzles and other statistical facts.
As Engel (2016) points out, these countries’ exchange rates are interesting to
study because they have been floating since the early 1970’s, with little state
direct intervention and deep markets, relatively little inflation and very little
default risk 2.
This paper first estimates a three variables Vector Error Correction Mechanism
(VECM) for country pairs between nominal exchange rate, interest rates differ-
ences and price differences. I use the setup of Engel (2016) with extended data
covering 1979-20203, but using quarterly data instead of monthly one.4
Secondly, I choose the best four-variable VECM between five types of gov-
ernment debt variables according to both intuition and cointegration relation’s
1Chaboud and Wright (2005) finds that below six hours, classic UIP actually holds well.
2Apart from Italy during the 2010-2011 sovereign bond crisis.
3Previous data covers 1979-2009.
4This choice is due to the second step where government data are only released as quarterly.
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smoothness 5. The chosen model is estimated in a sample 2000-2020 due to data
availability. Multiple regressions are performed after the VECM estimation.
First, I estimate Fama regressions both on real and nominal terms. These
equations regress one step ahead excess currency returns against interest rates
differences.
Second, I regress the level of real exchange rate on differences in real interest
rates.
Third, I regress the sum of future expected excess currency returns on differ-
ences in real interest rates to estimate the potential reversal of the UIP puzzle
( i.e. the new UIP puzzle).
Fourth, I regress far-ahead ex-ante excess currency returns on real and nominal
differences in interest rates, doing so also over different subsamples. Fifth, I
regress far-ahead ex-post excess currency returns on real and nominal differ-
ences in interet rates, for multiple quarters up to three years.
The following step adds debt variables to the previous equations. Generally
I first estimate equations adding only the relative debt innovations, while in a
second round I add to the estimation the total amount of Home government
debt (US debt) and Foreign government debt.
Estimation results bring surprises. There is one key result from the model with-
out debt in the quarterly sample 1979-2020: I do find the classic UIP puzzle
but I cannot find the new UIP puzzle in the data.
This is stated by three regression results. First in eq. 9 I find positive and not
significant coefficients for differences in real rates with respect to the future sums
of expected foreign excess currency returns. In Engel(2016) these coefficients
were negative and significant. This result is influenced by the different trend-
cycle decomposition used for building the LHS of the equation, since I used an
Hodrick-Prescott filter while Engel used the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition.
Second in eq 10 and 11 I find mostly positive coefficients, while Engel finds a lot
of negative ones. This means that differences in real and nominal rates covary
positively with far-ahead ex-ante excess currency returns.
Third in eq. 12 and 13 I find positive coefficients, while Engel finds negative
ones. This means that differences in real and nominal rates covary positively
with far-ahead ex-post excess currency returns.
The model with debt in the quarterly sample 2000-2020 brings some interesting
findings.
First, the debt variables are significant for all the equations considered apart
from the Fama regressions in real and nominal terms (where Foreign debt is
somewhat significant in a minority of countries).
Second, introducing debt variables changes sign of coefficients for five out of
eight sets of equations. For eq. 8a on the level of real exchange rate, for eq.
10a on ex-ante far-ahead excess currency returns and for eq. 12a on ex-post
far-ahead excess currency returns.
5The debt variables have been added as fourth variables in the ordering.
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Third, the magnitude of the coefficients for debt is economically important.
Consider a 1 trillion increase in debt variables. For the real and nominal Fama
regressions, Foreign debt has single digit percentage effects, while for the other
regressions it has between single and double digit percentage effects.
Fourth, the coefficients on foreign debt are always an order of magnitude greater
in absolute value than the coefficients on the other debt variables.
Fifth, the sign of US debt and Foreign debt are respectively positive and nega-
tive for almost all set of equations apart from the one in levels that is eq. 8a.
These coefficients are not in line with government debt only as a function of
past convenience yields, that would require opposite signs.
Sixth, relative debt innovations may be interpreted as differences in convenience
yields, i.e. as −(Ψh −Ψf ) in Valchev (2020). Real convenience yields are posi-
tively correlated with real foreign excess currency returns (eq. 7a).
From a general standpoint, the results in eq. 7 and 8 partially solve one of the
central puzzle of Engel (2016). Indeed, for France, Germany and Canada’s pairs
the high interest countries have now the lower level of real exchange rate that
confirms them as the riskier countries in a bilateral comparison. Similarly, Italy
and Japan have negative point estimates in eq. 8, but they are not statistically
significant. These results strongly support a new coherence of the ”risk” frame-
work over the standard textbook Mundell-Fleming model.
In conclusion, this paper does not find confirmation of the reversal of UIP puzzle
for the whole 1979-2020 sample at quarterly level, but only for the 2000-2020
sample. Taking into account government debt variables is helpful to study the
new UIP puzzle, but not the classic one. Differences in interest rates are posi-
tively correlated with ex-ante and ex-post excess currency returns, while Home
government debt is positively correlated and Foreign government debt is nega-
tively correlated.
Sections 2 outlines the literature review, Section 3 explains data sources, Section
4 explains the model, Section 5 shows regression results, Section 6 concludes.
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1.2 Literature review
The literature review on these topics is big and expanding. For somewhat
comprehensive review, see Engel (1996) and Engel (2014).
The Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle in its classical form has been introduced
by Fama (1984): defining st =
Home
Foreign as log nominal ER (↑ st means Home
depreciate), a typical Fama regression:
st+1 − st = α+ β(it − i∗t ) + εt+1
Data suggests that β̂ < 0 instead of β = 1, i.e. high interest rates countries see
overtime an appreciation of currency up to quarter time frequency.
This paper builds on two main previous works: Engel (2016) and Valchev (2020).
Valchev (2020) uses panel data to find empirical evidence of convenience yields’
importance for the classic and new UIP. He also builds a theoretical model with
endogenous convenience yields’ fluctuations that replicates both the classic UIP
puzzle and the new one.
Ishtoki and Mukhin (2017) explain 6 exchange rate puzzles by using a setup
that blends international asset demand shocks with a framework that makes
these shocks propagates very little within the pair of countries. In their paper,
shocks propagates little because of Home bias in consumption, weak substitu-
ability between domestic and foreign goods (little variance of Terms of Trade)
and strategic complementarieties in price setting. They find that an increase
in the demand for Foreign assets decreases the ex-ante foreign currency excess
returns. In this paper, I find evidence that increase in supply of foreign govern-
ment debt decreases the ex-ante and ex-post foreign currency excess returns.
Lately convenience yields and liquidity have been growingly incorporated in in-
ternational macroeconomics and finance. Among the contributions, the paper
by Krishnamurty and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) finds that when debt to GDP
ratio is low, Treasuries are more scarce and there is higher convenience yield.
This implies that supply of government bonds impacts convenience yields such
that higher supply decreases them.
In addition to Valchev (2020), there have been several key contributions. There
are models that use the idea of bond convenience yields for closed economy
asset puzzles, as Bansal and Coleman (1996) and Lagos (2010). The idea is
that certain assets give an additional benefit other than the bare interest rate.
Jiang et al (2018) build a theory that links demand for foreign safe assets and
the nominal exchange rate for US. They claim to solve most of the exchange
rate disconnect puzzle for US by defining a specific form of convenience yield.
By defining as convenience yield the different yield between foreign government
bonds and US bonds, they show that an increase in this convenience yield im-
plies an impact appreciation of the dollar and a following depreciation that
increases the ex-ante foreign currency excess return.
Engel and Wu (2019) find that accounting for liquidity yield on government
bonds gives explanatory power to monetary shocks and price differences, differ-
ently from what the literature on forecasting and exchange rate disconnect had
previously found.
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Du et al (2018) study convenience yields for G10 currencies between 2000 and
2016. They include in their study US, Germany, Japan, UK that are useful
for this work. The US treasury premium is defined as the convenience yield
on US treasury bonds minus the convenience yield on foreign treasury bonds,
such that a positive premium implies that US convenience yield is higher than
foreign. They find that there are country-pair treasury premia with different
average and dynamics. Treasury premia at 3 month horizon are higher than 5
year horizon, and they both increased during the Global Financial Crisis with
higher jump by the 3 month premia. Moreover, there has been a steady decline
in treasury premia after the GFC for the currencies considered. In line with this
evidence, I find that US total debt has decisively lower coefficients than foreign
total debt in prediction of both ex-ante and ex-post currency excess returns.
Against this evidence, I find that the sign of coefficients is inverted: total US
government debt correlates positively with foreign excess currency return and
total foreign debt correlates negatively with foreign excess currency returns.
Van Bisbergen et al (2019) use a new methodology to estimate risk-free rates
between 2004 and 2018, using the put-call parity relationship for European style
options. By this method, they get risk-free rates from risky assets and compare
them to risk- free rates on government bonds. The difference is indeed the
convenience yield. As Du et al (2018), they find higher convenience yields at
short term rather than long term horizon (65 versus 40 basis point) and strongly
varying in time of financial distress.
Moreover they find that a forecasting factor constructed from cross section of
convenience yields (a la Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005) has substantial forecasting
power for both government bond excess returns (conventional risk premia) and
their risk-free rate excess returns (risk premia minus the convenience yields),
even when controlling for other factors of the literature. This evidence parallels
my results that total government debt covaries with currency excess returns.
Lilley et al (2019) define as “Exchange Rate Reconnect” the fact that after the
GFC , exchange rates correlate with macroeconomic fundamentals according to
both IMF data 6 and a micro datasets with security level data. In particular,
broad US dollar comoves closely with global risk appetite. In addition, only
between 2007-2012 the broad US dollar co-moves also with US foreign bond
purchases, even if they conclude that this correlation is probably caused by the
movement in global risk appetite. The broad dollar and global risk appetite co-
movement seems to depend on the changed relations between dollar and riskier
currencies, such as Australian dollar. When US investors buy less US treasuries
or more domestic corporate debt, the dollar depreciates.
Other approaches to the topic of safe and liquid assets includes Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2017) on the safe asset conundrum and the same authors for
the consequences of this for the growing difference between capital and equity
risk premia.
One key aspect of the study is the long-run relation of nominal exchange rate
6balance of payment data and International Investment positions to measure quarterly US
capital flows
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with macroeconomic variables. Being unit root processes, the presence of a spe-
cific long run relation takes the form of cointegration. As Engel (2014) reports,
there are 4 studies that find cointegration between economic fundamentals and
exchange rates: Groen (2000), Mark and Sul (2001), Rapach and Wohar (2002),
Cerra and Saxena (2010).
Groen (2000) studies cointegration between exchange rates and macroeconomic
fundamentals given by the “monetary exchange model” (assuming quantity the-
ory of money). Using both time series and panel data, the conclusion is that
there is indeed cointegration between 14 bilateral exchange rates (with US and
with the German mark) with relative log money supplies and relative log pro-
duction.
This paper finds cointegration among nominal exchange rates and two funda-
mentals such as relative price differences and relative interest rates differences,
plus adding relative government debt shocks.
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1.3 Data
Price level data are taken from OECD quarterly data, with 2010 as base year.
Government debt data are from the BIS, using nominal value data in US billion
dollars.
Nominal exchange rates are daily values taken for every first day of the quarter
at FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. To be noted that this means
that in the dataset, the nominal ER of December is the nominal ER of the first
day of January.
Interest rates are constructed by using daily data of 1-month annual Eurorates
provided by Intercapital from June 1979 to July or October 2020, depending
on the pair of countries considered. These quarterly rates are calculated using
this formula (as an example, the first 3 month of each year): (1 + rjanuary)(1 +
rfebruary)(1 + rmarch)− 1
This strategy should be equal to sell short a foreign bond today, convert foreign
currency into dollars, buy US bonds, rollover the 1 month bond for 2 time until




This analysis follows closely the setup by Engel (2016).
I analyze country pairs for G6 countries with the United States as Home country
and Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK as Foreign countries (whose
variables are denoted by an asterisk). I consider quarterly data for prices,
interest rates and nominal exchange rates.
it is Home one-period nominal interest rate for deposits that pays off at time
t+1.
st is the log of foreign exchange rate, denoted as US dollar price of foreign
currency. This means that lower st implies dollar appreciation.
The excess return on foreign deposit from t to t+1 is:
ρt+1 ≡ st+1 − st + i∗t − it (1)
To be clear, this is the first-order log approximation of foreign excess return,
expressed in Home currency terms.7 In this paper, expected excess returns for
one period ahead are defined as Etρt+1.
rt is the ex-ante real interest rate, defined approximately by rt = it − Etπt+1,
where πt+1 ≡ pt+1 − pt. This means that we approximate the real interest rate
by taking the expectation of the difference between log prices tomorrow minus
log prices today. As above, the variance of inflation is assumed constant.
The real exchange rate is qt ≡ st + p∗t − pt.
I am interested in the classic UIP puzzle both in nominal and real terms, re-
spectively defined here as: cov(Etρt+1, i
∗
t − it) > 0 and cov(Etqt+1 − qt + r∗t −
rt, r
∗
t − rt) > 0
In order to account for the new UIP puzzle, I am interested in the sum of future
deviations from the UIP parity.
Engel (2016) explain in details his reasoning, but here is a quicker explanation.




(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄)) = sIPt − sTt (2)




t+j − it+j − ¯(i∗ − i)) is the infinite sum of future ex-
pected UIP deviations from their mean and sTt = st− lim︸︷︷︸
k→∞
(Etst+k−k ¯(s+1 − s))
is the transitory component, affected by a mean zero random walk that is the
second part.
In simple terms, I am interested in the covariance between real interest rate dif-
ferences and future expected excess returns, to see whether higher than average
interest rates covary positively or else with future expected excess returns.
Intuitively, if UIP holds then Etρt+j = 0 for j a positive integer. Hence if UIP
holds at all periods, the differences between the expected excess returns and
their mean should be equal to zero. In this paper, I use a particular approxi-
mation of (Et
∑∞
j=0(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄)) by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to identify
7See Engel (2016) and (1996) for the role of variance in expected excess returns.
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sTt .
Considering 2 and adding prices on both sides, Engel finds a real exchange rate






(r∗t+j − rt+j − ¯(r∗ − r))− Et
∞∑
j=0
(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄) (3)
Differences in today real exchange rate from his long-run mean is given respec-
tively by sum of future expected differences in real interest rates (UIP condition)
minus the UIP deviations.
Below here I write the main equations:
A version of the Fama regression:
ρt+1 = ζs + βs(i
∗
t − it) + us,t+1 (4)
The VECM setup a la Engel:
xt =





The real version of Fama regression:
qt+1 − qt + r̂∗t − r̂t = ζq + βq(r̂∗t − r̂t) + uq,t+1 (7)
The regression of real exchange rate on differences in real interest rates:
qt = ζQ + βQ(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + uQ,t+1 (8)
Eq. 9 search for comovements between the sum of future expected excess




(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄) = ζρ + βρ(r̂∗t − r̂t) + uρ,t (9)
Eq. 10 and 11 search for comovements between expected future excess cur-
rency returns and interest rates, respectively real and nominal:
Êt(ρt+j) = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t (10)
Êt(ρt+j) = ζj + βj(i
∗
t − it) + u
j
t (11)
8The key assumption here is that Purchasing Power Parity holds in the long run, hence
the real exchange rate is stationary and the second term on LHS is the unconditional mean
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Eq. 12 and 13 search for comovements between ex-post future excess cur-
rency returns and interest rates, respectively real and nominal:
ρt+j = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t (12)
ρt+j = ζj + βj(i
∗
t − it) + u
j
t (13)
In my empirical excercise, I use Stata 15 and the VECM package found
there.
For every Home-Foreign pair, I compared different information criteria to get
the optimal lag lenght. As a general criteria, I gave preferences to single coin-
tegration relation unless impossible to find.
After the 3 variables VECM, I add debt variables. I build 4 variables VECM
in order to estimate properly the long-run relations between price differential,
interest rate differential, nominal exchange rate and debt variables.
I have collected data from the BIS on nominal value in billion of dollars of out-
standing government debt. Nominal value is taken to parse out consideration
of value of debt and overall default risk: I want to observe known quantities in-
stead of a function of these quantities that represents a judgement by markets.
For every 2 country pair Home-Foreign, I created 5 VECMs with a different
specification of debt variables :
1. debtt = ∆debtHome,t −∆debtForeign,t
2. debtt = debtHome,t − debtForeign,t
3. debtt = ∆debtForeign,t
4. debtt = ∆debtHome,t
5. debtt = debHome,t
The first is the relative difference in debt emission respect to the previous
period, the second is the relative debt difference, the third is the difference of
Foreign country’s debt emission, the fourth is the difference in Home country’s
debt emission, the fifth is the Home debt (US debt).
The comparison of different options for the debt variables is useful to see what
type of variable best represent a cointegration relation with the other 3 vari-
ables. The evaluation of this is done using two criteria: theoretical intuition and
visual comparison of cointegration relationship. Theoretical intuition suggests
that convenience yields are about relative marginal changes in debt emission,
hence the first specification should be the best. Another specification that might
make sense is the third one, in case US government debt are ignored in a two
country setup since they matter for all countries because they are the dominant
currency.
Visual comparison of the cointegration relationships over time works as the more
11








The final choice is for the first specification of the VECM for every country
pair, the one with debtt = ∆debtHome,t −∆debtForeign,t 9.
9Cointegration relations are graphed in the Online Appendix for all the 5 specifications for
country pairs, together with information on rank and lag choice.
12
1.5 Regression results
First, I estimate Eq. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, in a sample of quarterly data between 1979
and 2020. Second, I estimate both the equations 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and equations
7a, 8a, 9a, 10a, 12a in which I added debt variables as covariates in a sample of
quarterly data between 2000 and 2020 10.
I show here one part of the result, picking the country pair US-France for equa-
tions 10,12 and 10a,12a. The full results are in Section C and D of the Appendix.
10Generally I first estimate equations adding only the relative debt innovations, while in a
second round I add to the estimation the total amount of Home government debt (US debt)
and Foreign government debt.
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First, for the full sample real Fama regression coefficients are significant and
slightly smaller than Engel’s, apart from Italy and Canada. For the smaller
sample, coefficients are positive, slightly smaller and significant. Foreign debt
coefficient is significant and negative only for France and Italy, with a 1 trillion
increase effect to -5 % for both. Equation 7:
qt+1 − qt + r̂∗t − r̂t = ζq + βq(r̂∗t − r̂t) + uq,t+1
Figure 1: Equation 7. Fama regression in real terms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.00178 -0.00326 0.000599 -0.00264 -0.00514 -0.00398
(0.26) (-0.49) (0.09) (-0.36) (-0.64) (-0.34)
Observations 160 162 162 162 159 161
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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qt+1 − qt + r̂∗t − r̂t = ζq + βq(r̂∗t − r̂t) + φqdebtt + uq,t+1 (7a)
Figure 2: Equation 7a. Real Fama regressions with debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Debt.US -0.000000614 -0.00000186 -0.00000182 0.00000131 -0.00000220 0.00000299

































Constant 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0441 0.0976∗∗∗ 0.0928∗∗∗ 0.0928∗∗∗ -0.00988
(3.47) (1.46) (3.15) (3.56) (4.99) (-0.18)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Second, for the full sample the level of real exchange rate is correlated with
real interest rate differences (apart from France and less for UK), but coefficients
are two order of magnitude littler than Engel’s. For the smaller sample, the
level of real exchange rate is positively correlated (but not significant) with real
interest rate differences only until all debt variables are included. Indeed this
brings a negative correlation between the level of real exchange rate and real
interest rate. All debt variables are significant and Foreign debt has big effects.
Equation 8:
qt = ζQ + βQ(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + uQ,t+1
Figure 3: Equation 8. Levels of real exchange rates and differences in real
interest rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.234∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ -4.420∗∗∗
(5.50) (-3.79) (6.26) (5.05) (9.44) (-62.62)
Observations 161 163 163 163 160 162
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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qt = ζQ + βQ(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + φQdebtt + uQ,t+1 (8a)
Figure 4: Equation 8a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Debt.US -0.0000546∗∗∗ -0.000135∗∗∗ -0.0000437∗∗∗ -0.000101∗∗∗ -0.000106∗∗∗ -0.0000884∗∗∗

































Constant -0.832∗∗∗ -1.229∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ -5.140∗∗∗
(-11.81) (-9.99) (-6.23) (-5.13) (7.03) (-40.05)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The results in Equations 7 and 8 constitute a significant redefinition of the
central puzzle in Engel (2016). Indeed, Engel (2016) finds on one side the
classic UIP puzzle for all the country pairs, while on the other side a positive
coefficient in eq. 8 states that high interest rates countries have higher level of
real exchange rates. This is a contradiction since the classic UIP puzzle implies
that high interest rate countries are riskier, while high level of real exchange
rates implies less risk. This contradiction puts ”risk” models on one side and
Mundell-Fleming models on the other, with both class of models being able to
explain just one of the two empirical facts.
My findings state that including government debt quantities in the estimation
changes the sign of the coefficients in eq. 8 for 5 pair of countries out of 6, with
3 that are statistically significant. For these country pairs, the Engel puzzle is
not anymore there: high interest rate countries are more risky in both ways,
from a UIP puzzle standpoint and by considering the now lower level of real
exchange rates.
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Third, for the full sample the sum of expected excess currency returns is
positively correlated with differences in real rates 11, but not significant. This
is starkly different from Engel’s negative and significant coefficients. For the
smaller sample, the sum of future expected excess currency returns is now neg-
atively correlated with differences in real rates. US debt and Foreign debt have
(mostly) significant coefficients, respectively positive and negative. A 1 trillion




(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄) = ζρ + βρ(r̂∗t − r̂t) + uρ,t
Figure 5: Equation 9. New UIP puzzle evidence.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.149∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(6.87) (5.74) (5.21) (-4.46) (11.33) (3.62)
Observations 161 163 163 163 160 162
t statistics in parentheses






(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄) = ζρ + βρ(r̂∗t − r̂t) + φρdebtt + uρ,t (9a)
Figure 6: Equation 9a.
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.Fra Sum.exp.exc.ret.Fra











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Fourth, for the full sample differences in real and nominal rates covary pos-
itively with far-ahead ex-ante excess currency returns, confirming the fourth
result and the difference with Engel’s. Negative coefficients are found only for
2005-2020 and for some countries. For the smaller sample, differences in real and
nominal rates covary (mostly) negatively with far-ahead ex-ante excess currency
returns without debt variables, while adding debt variables creates a positive
correlation.
US debt coefficients are all positive and significant, Foreign debt coefficients are
all negative and significant. Equation 10:
Êt(ρt+j) = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t
In both the above equations, I computed the LHS by using an in-sample
dynamic forecast. This forecast has been repeated for 3 time spans: post 1985
(columns 1 and 2), post 1995 (columns 3 and 4) and post 2005 (columns 5 and
6), in order to have different subsamples of data considered. This equations give
betas that are a weighted average of the set of betas shown by Engel.
Figure 7: Equation 10. France.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra
(r*-r) France 1.326∗∗∗ 0.125 -0.124
(4.93) (0.25) (-1.04)
(i*-i) France 1.592∗∗∗ 0.189 -0.203
(4.80) (0.23) (-0.97)
Constant -0.678∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.0650+ -0.0637 -0.0480∗∗∗ -0.0496∗∗∗
(-20.06) (-20.62) (-1.77) (-1.58) (-3.27) (-3.19)
Observations 143 143 104 104 64 64
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Êt(ρt+j) = ζ10a + β10a(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + φjdebtt + u
j
t (10a)
In both the above equations, I computed the LHS by using an in-sample
dynamic forecast. This forecast has been repeated for 3 time spans: post 2005
(columns 1 and 2), post 2010 (columns 3 and 4) and post 2015 (columns 5 and
6), in order to have different subsamples of data considered. This equations give
betas that are a weighted average of the set of betas shown by Engel.
Figure 8: Equation 10a-11a. France.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra
(r*-r) France -0.591+ -1.045∗∗∗ 0.313
(-1.87) (-5.66) (0.86)
(i*-i) France -0.860+ -1.561∗∗∗ 0.602
(-1.87) (-3.48) (1.53)
Constant 0.0509∗∗ 0.0492∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.00238 0.0155
(2.22) (2.19) (3.69) (3.13) (0.09) (0.71)
Observations 63 65 43 45 23 25
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.888∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(5.13) (5.35) (4.69)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra -0.0000236 -0.0000183 -0.0000716∗∗∗ -0.0000455∗∗∗ -0.0000509∗∗∗ -0.0000314∗∗
(-0.66) (-0.74) (-6.58) (-3.10) (-3.80) (-2.13)
Debt.US 0.0000527∗∗∗ 0.0000561∗∗∗ 0.0000499∗∗∗ 0.0000489∗∗∗ 0.0000380∗∗∗ 0.0000342∗∗∗
(11.50) (17.14) (17.56) (9.36) (7.38) (10.99)
Debt.Fra -0.000381∗∗∗ -0.000408∗∗∗ -0.000434∗∗∗ -0.000392∗∗∗ -0.000402∗∗∗ -0.000340∗∗∗
(-11.63) (-13.91) (-13.27) (-12.30) (-13.84) (-10.09)
(i*-i) France 1.279∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗
(8.53) (2.48) (4.96)
Constant 0.204∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗
(8.15) (7.91) (6.23) (3.60) (5.05) (2.74)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Fifth, for the full sample differences in real and nominal rates covary posi-
tively with far-ahead ex-post excess currency returns, differently from Engel’s.
For the smaller sample, differences in real and nominal rates still covary posi-
tively with far-ahead ex-post excess currency returns, but they often lose signifi-
cance. US debt coefficients are significant and positive, Foreign debt coefficients
are significant and negative.
Equation 12:
ρt+j = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t
This regression uses ex-post excess returns on foreign deposit. The regression
is performed from 1 quarter to 12 quarters (3 years).
Figure 9: Equation 12. France.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Fran Exc.ret.t+2.Fra Exc.ret.t+3.Fra Exc.ret.t+4.Fra Exc.ret.t+5.Fra Exc.ret.t+6.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.915∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗
(17.21) (11.69) (8.40) (6.43) (5.46) (4.43)
Constant 0.000382 -0.00129 -0.00256 -0.00343 -0.00478 -0.00484
(0.07) (-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.22) (-0.20)
Observations 162 161 160 159 158 157
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Fra Exc.ret.t+8.Fra Exc.ret.t+9.Fra Exc.ret.t+10.Fra Exc.ret.t+11.Fra Exc.ret.t+12.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.881∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(3.92) (3.67) (3.52) (3.70) (3.85) (4.02)
Constant -0.00481 -0.00556 -0.00578 -0.00711 -0.00585 -0.00583
(-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.16)
Observations 156 155 154 153 152 151
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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ρt+j = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + φjdebtt + u
j
t (12a)
Figure 10: Equation 12a. France.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Fran Exc.ret.t+2.Fra Exc.ret.t+3.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.490∗∗ 0.360 0.420∗∗
(2.58) (1.55) (2.07)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000138 0.0000436 0.0000419
(0.47) (0.94) (0.77)
Debt.Fra -0.0000573∗∗ -0.000118∗∗∗ -0.000180∗∗∗
(-2.47) (-3.27) (-4.37)
Debt.US 0.00000218 0.00000630 0.0000114∗∗
(0.70) (1.38) (2.05)
Constant 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(3.69) (4.46) (6.13)
Observations 76 76 75
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.Fra Exc.ret.t+5.Fra Exc.ret.t+6.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.513∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗
(2.50) (2.83) (2.61)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000426 0.0000311 0.0000260
(0.94) (0.77) (0.67)
Debt.Fra -0.000236∗∗∗ -0.000267∗∗∗ -0.000291∗∗∗
(-5.32) (-5.71) (-5.96)
Debt.US 0.0000162∗∗∗ 0.0000189∗∗∗ 0.0000198∗∗∗
(2.66) (3.17) (3.24)
Constant 0.279∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(7.47) (7.58) (8.05)
Observations 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 11: Equation 12a. France.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.Fra Exc.ret.t+8.Fra Exc.ret.t+9.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.452+ 0.478+ 0.468
(1.95) (1.80) (1.61)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000226 0.0000488 0.0000540
(0.55) (1.05) (1.00)
Debt.Fra -0.000319∗∗∗ -0.000358∗∗∗ -0.000377∗∗∗
(-6.48) (-7.69) (-7.89)
Debt.US 0.0000217∗∗∗ 0.0000252∗∗∗ 0.0000263∗∗∗
(3.46) (4.33) (4.40)
Constant 0.388∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(8.63) (9.20) (9.31)
Observations 71 70 69
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.Fra Exc.ret.t+11.Fra Exc.ret.t+12.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.582∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.93) (3.76)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000455 0.0000157 -0.00000488
(0.81) (0.33) (-0.12)
Debt.Fra -0.000397∗∗∗ -0.000396∗∗∗ -0.000396∗∗∗
(-8.27) (-7.92) (-8.35)
Debt.US 0.0000282∗∗∗ 0.0000283∗∗∗ 0.0000279∗∗∗
(4.77) (4.77) (5.07)
Constant 0.463∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(9.53) (9.53) (9.99)
Observations 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Eq. 9 and eq. 10 mark another difference with the Engel paper. Engel finds
that the sum of future expected excess returns (minus the mean) is negatively
correlated with real interest rates difference at monthly level between 1979 and
2009. This paper finds otherwise since in the full 1979-2020 sample at quarterly
level there is no trace of the new UIP puzzle, i.e. the reversal of UIP puzzle.
This result is confirmed by the two first columns of Figure 7, where there are
positive coefficients in eq. 10 for France.
The new UIP puzzle is found in the subsample 2000-2020, as certified by eq. 9a
and 10a. By using debt in the estimation process, but without including it as
regressor, the new UIP puzzle exists in the subsample.
A further difference emerges when the debt variables are included as regressors,
since real interest rate differences become positively correlated again. This com-
plicates the interpretation and remains as an additional puzzle.
There are some comments on the results from a government debt standpoint.
In this framework, the debt variable used inside the VECM is debtt = ∆debtHome,t−
∆debtForeign,t From now on, let’s call it delta to differentiate it from total debt
. This is a relative debt innovation at time t. For the purpose of comparison,
a positive shock to this variable is having an effect that is similar to a nega-
tive shock to the difference in convenience yields. For example, in the Valchev
(2020) framework, a positive shock to delta is a negative shock to Ψh − Ψf . I
am not interested in the comparable magnitude of the shock, but on the general
intuition of it.
One key dimension of analysis is the comparison between the effect of delta and
the effect of total US and foreign debt. Indeed it is interesting to see whether
all the signs are coherent with a convenience yield story.
The main results are stated here.
First, in eq. 7a delta’s coefficients are negative. This means that real foreign
excess currency returns are positively correlated with convenience yields.
Second, when the regression includes all forms of debt, in eq. 7a US debt
has (mostly) a positive coefficient, while foreign debt has a negative coefficient.
These signs are not consistent with government debt being a unique function of
convenience yields.
Third, in eq. 8a delta’s coefficients are positive, US debt’s coefficients are neg-
ative and Foreign debt’s ones are positive.
Fourth, in eq. 9a delta’s coefficients are positive, US debt’s coefficients are posi-
tive and Foreign debt’s ones are negative. These three coefficients are consistent
among themselves.
By using 9a, all three groups of coefficients are consistent between estimation,
but they are not consistent with a convenience yield story. Indeed, increase in
Home debt implies a decrease in relative convenience yields and this makes the
foreign excess currency return to increase, contrary to theory (the reasoning is
inverse for foreign debt increases).
Fifth, in eq. 10a delta’s coefficients are negative, US debt’s coefficients are pos-
itive and Foreign debt’s ones are negative.
Sixth, in eq. 12a delta’s coefficients are positive, US debt’s coefficients are pos-
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itive and Foreign debt’s ones are negative.
In the last two points it is clear that US debt and foreign debt are not in line
with a convenience yield story.
27
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies exchange rates and government debt. This is motivated by
growing evidence that liquidity measures and asset demand shocks are important
for solving exchange rates puzzles.
In this paper, I compare a Engel (2016) framework with extended data with
one augmented by government debt variables for a shorter period of time due
to data availability. After selecting the best debt definition for the VECM, I
proceed to estimate Fama regressions in real variables, an equation to directly
links real exchange rate levels and differences in real interest rates and equations
to verify the existence of the new UIP puzzle. This is done by regressing far-
ahead ex-ante and ex-post excess currency returns against real interest rates
differences.
Results confirm only partially Engel (2016) results, since the new UIP puzzle is
not found in the sample without debt.
Once debt variables are introduced, there are some interesting results and here
we outline some of them. First, the debt variables are significant for all the
equations considered apart from the Fama regressions. Second, introducing
debt variables changes sign of coefficients for five out of eight sets of equations.
Third, the magnitude of the coefficients for debt is economically important.
Consider a 1 trillion increase in debt variables. For the real Fama regressions
Foreign debt has single digit percentage effects, while for the other regressions
it has between single and double digit percentage effects. Fourth, the sign of
coefficients for total government debt are not in line with government debt only
as a function of past convenience yields, since that would require opposite signs.
Fifth, the central puzzle of Engel (2016) is resolved for 3 out of 6 country pairs
since high interest rates countries are riskier both from a level of exchange rates
standpoint and a rate of exchange rates standpoint.
All together, these findings place government debt in a new light for the study
of currency excess returns.
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Appendix C. Classic and new UIP puzzle without debt vari-
ables.
This section estimates Eq. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 in a sample of quarterly data between
1979 and 2020.
The main findings are anticipated here.
First, real Fama regression coefficients are significant and slightly smaller than
Engel’s, apart from Italy and Canada.
Second, the level of real exchange rate is correlated with real interest rate dif-
ferences (apart from France and less for UK), but coefficients are two order of
magnitude littler than Engel’s.
Third, the sum of expected excess currency returns is positively correlated with
differences in real rates 12, but not significant. This is starkly different from
Engel’s negative and significant coefficients.
Fourth, differences in real rates covary positively with far-ahead ex-ante excess
currency returns, confirming the third result and the difference with Engel’s.
Negative coefficients are found only for 2005-2020 and for some countries.
Fifth, differences in real rates covary positively with far-ahead ex-post excess
currency returns, differently from Engel’s.
Modifying slightly Fama (1984), uncovered interest parity implies that βs = 0
and ζs = 0. Previous studies find that βs > 0 that is the UIP puzzle. Equations




qt+1 − qt + r̂∗t − r̂t = ζq + βq(r̂∗t − r̂t) + uq,t+1
It is a Fama regression in real terms, built using estimates coming from the
VECM. Coefficients are slightly smaller here for 4 country pairs, apart from
Italy and Canada.
Figure 12: Equation 7. Fama regression in real terms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.00178 -0.00326 0.000599 -0.00264 -0.00514 -0.00398
(0.26) (-0.49) (0.09) (-0.36) (-0.64) (-0.34)
Observations 160 162 162 162 159 161
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Equation 8:
qt = ζQ + βQ(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + uQ,t+1
This equation states how real exchange rate covaries with differences in real
interest rates.
Coefficients are remarkably little respect to Engel (2016): the difference is two
orders of magnitude. Significance is absent for France and at 95% for UK
Figure 13: Equation 8. Levels of real exchange rates and differences in real
interest rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.234∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ -4.420∗∗∗
(5.50) (-3.79) (6.26) (5.05) (9.44) (-62.62)
Observations 161 163 163 163 160 162
t statistics in parentheses






(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄) = ζρ + βρ(r̂∗t − r̂t) + uρ,t
This equation get the LHS by Eq 2 and defines the new UIP puzzle: do higher
real interest rates countries see higher or lower cumulative anticipated risk pre-
miums ?
The temporary component of nominal exchange rate is derived by using a
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Coefficients are very different from Engel (2016): posi-
tive instead of strongly negative (apart from Japan) and in general not signifi-
cant.
Figure 14: Equation 9. New UIP puzzle evidence.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.149∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(6.87) (5.74) (5.21) (-4.46) (11.33) (3.62)
Observations 161 163 163 163 160 162
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
34
Equation 10:
Êt(ρt+j) = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t
This equation is meant to capture specific betas at different expectation’ hori-
zons, to see if and where the reversal of UIP takes place.
I implemented regressions:
Êt(ρt+j) = ζ10b + β10b(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t (10b)
In the above equation, I computed the LHS by using an in-sample dynamic
forecast. This forecast has been repeated for 3 time spans: post 1985 (columns
1 and 2), post 1995 (columns 3 and 4) and post 2005 (columns 5 and 6), in
order to have different subsamples of data considered. This equation give betas
that are a weighted average of the set of betas shown by Engel.
For most country pairs, the only negative value I find comes on post 2005 data,
while for the whole sample (columns 1 and 2) a positive coefficient means that
in quarterly data there is no reversal of UIP puzzle.
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Figure 15: Equation 10. Italy and Canada.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.387∗∗ 0.352 -0.356∗∗
(2.34) (1.49) (-2.15)
(i*-i) Italy 0.434∗∗ 0.469 -0.603∗∗
(2.32) (1.55) (-2.21)
Constant -0.177∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗ 0.0633∗∗ -0.0167 -0.0219
(-6.96) (-6.97) (2.36) (2.38) (-0.92) (-1.18)
Observations 143 143 104 104 64 64
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Can Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Can Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Can Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.853∗∗∗ -0.137 -0.554
(2.65) (-0.19) (-0.98)
(i*-i) Canada 0.903∗∗∗ -0.166 -1.258
(2.72) (-0.18) (-1.49)
Constant -0.120∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.0914∗∗∗ -0.0898∗∗∗
(-4.13) (-4.14) (-5.77) (-5.80) (-4.58) (-4.52)
Observations 143 143 103 103 63 63
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 16: Equation 10. France and Germany.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra
(r*-r) France 1.326∗∗∗ 0.125 -0.124
(4.93) (0.25) (-1.04)
(i*-i) France 1.592∗∗∗ 0.189 -0.203
(4.80) (0.23) (-0.97)
Constant -0.678∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.0650+ -0.0637 -0.0480∗∗∗ -0.0496∗∗∗
(-20.06) (-20.62) (-1.77) (-1.58) (-3.27) (-3.19)
Observations 143 143 104 104 64 64
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.296 0.252 -0.643+
(1.39) (0.67) (-1.87)
(i*-i) Germany 0.403 0.434 -1.022+
(1.53) (0.73) (-1.91)
Constant -0.348∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0975∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗
(-14.28) (-14.31) (3.11) (3.07) (2.77) (2.56)
Observations 143 143 104 104 64 64
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 17: Equation 10. Japan and United Kingdom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post1985.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post1995.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.585∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.0805
(3.12) (3.18) (0.24)
(i*-i) Japan 1.312∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗ 0.263
(3.34) (3.49) (0.39)
Constant -0.354∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.0821 0.0907
(-9.45) (-6.61) (6.56) (6.39) (1.53) (1.35)
Observations 143 143 103 103 63 63
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post1985.UK Exp.exc.ret.post1985.UK Exp.exc.ret.post1995.UK Exp.exc.ret.post1995.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2005.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2005.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.213 -0.437+ -0.534∗∗
(1.45) (-1.86) (-2.07)
(i*-i) UK 0.327+ -0.757+ -1.262∗∗
(1.74) (-1.67) (-2.15)
Constant -0.0362+ -0.0424+ 0.0162 0.0223 0.0196 0.0239
(-1.67) (-1.76) (0.74) (0.94) (0.80) (1.03)
Observations 143 143 103 103 63 63
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Equation 12:
ρt+j = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + u
j
t
This regression uses ex-post excess returns on foreign deposit. The regression is
performed from 1 quarter to 12 quarters (3 years). Coefficients are consistently
positive and significant for all countries at all time, hence confirming that the
new UIP puzzle does not result in quarterly data in this form.
Figure 18: Equation 12. Canada.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Can Exc.ret.t+2.Can Exc.ret.t+3.Can Exc.ret.t+4.Can Exc.ret.t+5.Can Exc.ret.t+6.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.975∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
(20.56) (11.05) (9.27) (7.21) (6.21) (5.49)
Constant -0.000262 -0.000816 -0.00250 -0.00298 -0.00456 -0.00575
(-0.08) (-0.14) (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.41)
Observations 162 161 160 159 158 157
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Can Exc.ret.t+8.Can Exc.ret.t+9.Can Exc.ret.t+10.Can Exc.ret.t+11.Can Exc.ret.t+12.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.975∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗
(4.59) (4.10) (3.56) (3.27) (2.93) (2.57)
Constant -0.00456 -0.00472 -0.00366 -0.00271 -0.00160 -0.000431
(-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.08) (-0.02)
Observations 156 155 154 153 152 151
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 19: Equation 12. France.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Fran Exc.ret.t+2.Fra Exc.ret.t+3.Fra Exc.ret.t+4.Fra Exc.ret.t+5.Fra Exc.ret.t+6.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.915∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗
(17.21) (11.69) (8.40) (6.43) (5.46) (4.43)
Constant 0.000382 -0.00129 -0.00256 -0.00343 -0.00478 -0.00484
(0.07) (-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.22) (-0.20)
Observations 162 161 160 159 158 157
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Fra Exc.ret.t+8.Fra Exc.ret.t+9.Fra Exc.ret.t+10.Fra Exc.ret.t+11.Fra Exc.ret.t+12.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.881∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(3.92) (3.67) (3.52) (3.70) (3.85) (4.02)
Constant -0.00481 -0.00556 -0.00578 -0.00711 -0.00585 -0.00583
(-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.16)
Observations 156 155 154 153 152 151
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 20: Equation 12. Italy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1)Ita Exc.ret.t+2.Ita Exc.ret.t+3.Ita Exc.ret.t+4.Ita Exc.ret.t+5.Ita Exc.ret.t+6.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.893∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(22.72) (15.12) (9.68) (7.98) (6.88) (6.00)
Constant 0.00493 0.00616 0.00762 0.00808 0.00792 0.00933
(0.90) (0.67) (0.60) (0.51) (0.41) (0.43)
Observations 160 159 158 157 156 155
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Ita Exc.ret.t+8.Ita Exc.ret.t+9.Ita Exc.ret.t+10.Ita Exc.ret.t+11.Ita Exc.ret.t+12.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.645∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(5.03) (4.48) (4.21) (4.00) (3.71) (3.48)
Constant 0.0116 0.0120 0.0139 0.0131 0.0134 0.0139
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Observations 154 153 152 151 150 149
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 21: Equation 12. Germany.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Germ Exc.ret.t+2.Ger Exc.ret.t+3.Ger Exc.ret.t+4.Ger Exc.ret.t+5.Ger Exc.ret.t+6.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.919∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗
(15.65) (9.91) (7.72) (6.34) (5.23) (4.67)
Constant -0.00224 -0.000849 0.000324 0.00260 0.00459 0.00615
(-0.41) (-0.09) (0.03) (0.16) (0.25) (0.30)
Observations 162 161 160 159 158 157
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Ger Exc.ret.t+8.Ger Exc.ret.t+9.Ger Exc.ret.t+10.Ger Exc.ret.t+11.Ger Exc.ret.t+12.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 1.005∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(4.08) (3.78) (3.38) (3.23) (2.98) (2.73)
Constant 0.00801 0.00981 0.0117 0.0151 0.0174 0.0195
(0.36) (0.41) (0.47) (0.58) (0.63) (0.68)
Observations 156 155 154 153 152 151
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 22: Equation 12. Japan.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Jap Exc.ret.t+2.Jap Exc.ret.t+3.Jap Exc.ret.t+4.Jap Exc.ret.t+5.Jap Exc.ret.t+6.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.604∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(5.55) (6.60) (6.21) (4.61) (4.36) (4.13)
Constant -0.0276∗∗∗ -0.0129 -0.00525 -0.00280 0.000167 0.00450
(-2.82) (-0.99) (-0.32) (-0.14) (0.01) (0.16)
Observations 161 160 159 158 157 156
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Jap Exc.ret.t+8.Jap Exc.ret.t+9.Jap Exc.ret.t+10.Jap Exc.ret.t+11.Jap Exc.ret.t+12.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.708∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗ 0.507+
(3.81) (3.36) (3.17) (3.02) (2.48) (1.96)
Constant 0.00844 0.00778 0.0137 0.0204 0.0196 0.0191
(0.27) (0.22) (0.36) (0.50) (0.46) (0.42)
Observations 155 154 153 152 151 150
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 23: Equation 12. UK.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) UK Exc.ret.t+2.UK Exc.ret.t+3.UK Exc.ret.t+4.UK Exc.ret.t+5.UK Exc.ret.t+6.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.762∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗
(8.39) (7.84) (6.66) (6.46) (6.06) (5.36)
Constant 0.00692 0.000764 -0.00275 -0.00579 -0.0116 -0.0147
(0.96) (0.07) (-0.21) (-0.36) (-0.61) (-0.68)
Observations 159 158 157 156 155 154
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.UK Exc.ret.t+8.UK Exc.ret.t+9.UK Exc.ret.t+10.UK Exc.ret.t+11.UK Exc.ret.t+12.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.912∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(4.82) (4.62) (4.26) (4.18) (3.80) (3.53)
Constant -0.0168 -0.0194 -0.0228 -0.0247 -0.0237 -0.0240
(-0.70) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.81) (-0.72) (-0.67)
Observations 153 152 151 150 149 148
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix D. Classic and new UIP puzzle with debt vari-
ables.
This section estimates both the equations 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and equations 7a, 8a, 9a, 10a, 12a
in which I added debt variables as covariates in a sample of quarterly data be-
tween 2000 and 2020. Generally I first estimate equations adding only the rela-
tive debt innovations, while in a second round I add to the estimation the total
amount of Home government debt (US debt) and Foreign government debt.
The main findings are anticipated here.
First, the real version of Fama regression coefficients are positive, slightly smaller
and significant. Foreign debt coefficient is significant and negative only for
France and Italy, with a 1 trillion increase effect to -5 % for both.
Second, the level of real exchange rate is positively correlated (but not signif-
icant) with real real interest rate differences only until all debt variables are
included. Indeed this brings a negative correlation between the level of real ex-
change rate and real interest rate. All debt variables are significant and Foreign
debt has big effects.
Third, the sum of future expected excess currency returns is now negatively cor-
related with differences in real rates. US debt and Foreign debt have (mostly)
significant coefficients, respectively positive and negative. A 1 trillion increase
in Foreign debt has an effect between -28 % and -5 %.
Fourth, without debt variables differences in real rates covary (mostly) nega-
tively with far-ahead ex-ante excess currency returns, while adding debt vari-
ables creates a positive correlation.
US debt coefficients are all positive and significant, Foreign debt coefficients are
all negative and significant.
Fifth, differences in real rates still covary positively with far-ahead ex-post ex-
cess currency returns, but they often lose significance. US debt coefficients are
significant and positive, Foreign debt coefficients are significant and negative.
In this framework, the debt variable used inside the VECM is debtt = ∆debtHome,t−
∆debtForeign,t From now on, let’s call it delta to differentiate it from total debt
. This is a relative debt innovation at time t. For the purpose of comparison,
a positive shock to this variable is having an effect that is similar to a nega-
tive shock to the difference in convenience yields. For example, in the Valchev
(2020) framework, a positive shock to delta is a negative shock to Ψh − Ψf . I
am not interested in the comparable magnitude of the shock, but on the general
intuition of it.
One key dimension of analysis is the comparison between the effect of delta
and the effect of total US and foreign debt. Indeed it is interesting to see
whether all the signs are coherent with a convenience yield story.
The main results are stated here.
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First, in eq. 7a delta’s coefficients are negative. This means that real for-
eign excess currency returns are positively correlated with convenience yields.
Second, when the regression includes all forms of debt, in eq. 7a US debt
has (mostly) a positive coefficient, while foreign debt has a negative coefficient.
These signs are not consistent with government debt being a unique function of
convenience yields.
Third, in eq. 8a delta’s coefficients are positive, US debt’s coefficients are neg-
ative and Foreign debt’s ones are positive.
Fourth, in eq. 9a delta’s coefficients are positive, US debt’s coefficients are posi-
tive and Foreign debt’s ones are negative. These three coefficients are consistent
among themselves.
By using 9a, all three groups of coefficients are consistent between estimation,
but they are not consistent with a convenience yield story. Indeed, increase in
Home debt implies a decrease in relative convenience yields and this makes the
foreign excess currency return to increase, contrary to theory (the reasoning is
inverse for foreign debt increases).
Fifth, in eq. 10a delta’s coefficients are negative, US debt’s coefficients are
positive and Foreign debt’s ones are negative.
Sixth, in eq. 12a delta’s coefficients are positive, US debt’s coefficients are pos-
itive and Foreign debt’s ones are negative.
In the last two points it is clear that US debt and foreign debt are not in line
with a convenience yield story.
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qt+1 − qt + r̂∗t − r̂t = ζq + βq(r̂∗t − r̂t) + φqdebtt + uq,t+1 (7a)
For the real version of the Fama regression, coefficients are slightly smaller and
positive. Adding debt variables is useful only for France and Italy, with negative
coefficients and somewhat significant.
On the first round of estimations, relative debt innovations are not significant,
while 1 trillion changes are between - 5 and 0 % effects.
On the second round of estimations, all debt variables are not significant except
for Foreign debt for Italy and France. 1 trillion changes have effects between
-3 and and 2.2% for relative debt innovations, -0.3 and 1.3 % for US debt and
between -5 and -0.5 % for Foreign debt.
Figure 24: Equation 7a. Real Fama regressions with debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.00254 0.00345 0.00184 0.00192 0.00455 -0.0251+
(0.26) (0.36) (0.19) (0.20) (0.51) (-1.98)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 25: Equation 7a. Real Fama regressions with debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























Constant 0.0104 0.00406 0.0117 0.00899 0.0101 -0.0194
(0.82) (0.33) (0.92) (0.71) (1.03) (-1.62)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 26: Equation 7a. Real Fama regressions with debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Debt.US -0.000000614 -0.00000186 -0.00000182 0.00000131 -0.00000220 0.00000299

































Constant 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0441 0.0976∗∗∗ 0.0928∗∗∗ 0.0928∗∗∗ -0.00988
(3.47) (1.46) (3.15) (3.56) (4.99) (-0.18)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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qt = ζQ + βQ(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + φQdebtt + uQ,t+1 (8a)
Coefficients are halved with respect to the estimation without debt. They are
positive and they lose significance (except for UK).
On the first round of estimation, βQs remain positive and relative debt innova-
tions are not significant except for UK. A 1 trillion change has effects between
-24 % (UK) and 29 % (Canada).
On the second round of estimations, βQs become negative and coefficients for
all debt variables are significant. Relative debt innovations have positive coef-
ficients, US debt has negative coefficients (except Uk and Japan) and Foreign
debt has big and positive coefficients. A 1 trillion change in Foreign debt has
effects between 22 % and 263 % .
Figure 27: Equation 8.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Constant 0.254∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ -4.346∗∗∗
(4.58) (-2.04) (5.12) (4.92) (7.53) (-55.02)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 28: Equation 8a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























Constant 0.241∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ -4.325∗∗∗
(3.16) (-2.37) (3.54) (3.52) (6.75) (-51.43)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 29: Equation 8a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Debt.US -0.0000546∗∗∗ -0.000135∗∗∗ -0.0000437∗∗∗ -0.000101∗∗∗ -0.000106∗∗∗ -0.0000884∗∗∗

































Constant -0.832∗∗∗ -1.229∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ -5.140∗∗∗
(-11.81) (-9.99) (-6.23) (-5.13) (7.03) (-40.05)
Observations 76 87 76 76 76 85
t statistics in parentheses





(ρt+j+1 − ρ̄) = ζρ + βρ(r̂∗t − r̂t) + φρdebtt + uρ,t (9a)
Coefficients βρ are negative and somewhat significant (except for Canada,
Japan). Adding debt variables makes βρs not significant, but still negative.
US debt’s coefficients are positive, strongly significant for Canada, Japan and
France, less for UK, no for Germany and Italy. Foreign debt’s coefficients are
all negative and significant. 1 trillion change in US debt has an effect between
0.4 and 2 % . 1 trillion change in Foreign debt has an effect between -28 and -5
% .
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Figure 30: Equation 9a.
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.Can Sum.exp.exc.ret.Can











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.Fra Sum.exp.exc.ret.Fra











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 31: Equation 9a.
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.Ger Sum.exp.exc.ret.Ger











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.Ita Sum.exp.exc.ret.Ita











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 32: Equation 9a.
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.Jap Sum.exp.exc.ret.Jap











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2)
Sum.exp.exc.ret.UK Sum.exp.exc.ret.UK











t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Êt(ρt+j) = ζ10a + β10a(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + φjdebtt + u
j
t (10a)
In the above equation, I computed the LHS by using an in-sample dynamic
forecast. This forecast has been repeated for 3 time spans: post 2005 (columns
1 and 2), post 2010 (columns 3 and 4) and post 2015 (columns 5 and 6), in order
to have different subsamples of data considered. This equation give betas that
are a weighted average of the set of betas shown by Engel. Consider that here
I use different time spans respect to the 3 variable VECM, hence comparison is
more tricky.
Comparing equations 10 and 10a, β10a go from mixed (both in sign and sig-
nificance) to strongly positive and significant. US debt’s coefficients are always
positive and significant, while Foreign debt’s coefficients are negative and signif-
icant. Only for Italy, Japan and UK the delta- variables have some significance
(they are positive).
In terms of magnitude of coefficients, 1 trillion change has single digit percent-
age effects on the dependent variables for relative debt innovations and US debt,
while has a double digit percentage effect for Foreign debt.
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Figure 33: Equation 10a. Canada.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.0206 -0.207 0.186∗∗
(0.12) (-1.01) (2.08)
(i*-i) Canada -0.963 -4.686∗∗∗ -0.404
(-0.70) (-4.58) (-0.58)
Constant -0.0130 -0.00774 0.157∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗
(-0.41) (-0.24) (4.30) (7.22) (3.12) (3.12)
Observations 63 64 43 44 23 24
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Can Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.313∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(4.02) (3.59) (3.84)
Rel.debt.innov.Can -0.0000279 -0.0000310 -0.0000647∗∗∗ -0.0000484∗∗ -0.0000348+ -0.0000111
(-0.89) (-1.26) (-3.60) (-2.71) (-1.77) (-0.49)
Debt.US 0.0000526∗∗∗ 0.0000556∗∗∗ 0.0000514∗∗∗ 0.0000548∗∗∗ 0.0000316∗∗∗ 0.0000306∗∗∗
(15.84) (18.70) (18.88) (16.65) (6.77) (6.33)
Debt.Can -0.000739∗∗∗ -0.000818∗∗∗ -0.000646∗∗∗ -0.000704∗∗∗ -0.000584∗∗∗ -0.000486∗∗∗
(-11.73) (-12.57) (-9.06) (-9.49) (-6.20) (-3.92)
(i*-i) Canada 1.211∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗ 0.683+
(4.40) (2.53) (1.87)
Constant 0.101∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.152+ 0.161∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.0926
(2.17) (3.21) (1.98) (2.49) (2.82) (0.76)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 34: Equation 10a. France.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra
(r*-r) France -0.591+ -1.045∗∗∗ 0.313
(-1.87) (-5.66) (0.86)
(i*-i) France -0.860+ -1.561∗∗∗ 0.602
(-1.87) (-3.48) (1.53)
Constant 0.0509∗∗ 0.0492∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.00238 0.0155
(2.22) (2.19) (3.69) (3.13) (0.09) (0.71)
Observations 63 65 43 45 23 25
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.888∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(5.13) (5.35) (4.69)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra -0.0000236 -0.0000183 -0.0000716∗∗∗ -0.0000455∗∗∗ -0.0000509∗∗∗ -0.0000314∗∗
(-0.66) (-0.74) (-6.58) (-3.10) (-3.80) (-2.13)
Debt.US 0.0000527∗∗∗ 0.0000561∗∗∗ 0.0000499∗∗∗ 0.0000489∗∗∗ 0.0000380∗∗∗ 0.0000342∗∗∗
(11.50) (17.14) (17.56) (9.36) (7.38) (10.99)
Debt.Fra -0.000381∗∗∗ -0.000408∗∗∗ -0.000434∗∗∗ -0.000392∗∗∗ -0.000402∗∗∗ -0.000340∗∗∗
(-11.63) (-13.91) (-13.27) (-12.30) (-13.84) (-10.09)
(i*-i) France 1.279∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗
(8.53) (2.48) (4.96)
Constant 0.204∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗
(8.15) (7.91) (6.23) (3.60) (5.05) (2.74)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 35: Equation 10a. Germany.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ger
(r*-r) Germany -0.601+ -1.061∗∗∗ 0.273
(-1.87) (-5.67) (0.78)
(i*-i) Germany -0.873+ -1.607∗∗∗ 0.591
(-1.84) (-3.51) (1.54)
Constant 0.0552∗∗ 0.0536∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0664∗∗∗ 0.00218 0.0167
(2.36) (2.36) (3.23) (2.70) (0.09) (0.80)
Observations 63 65 43 45 23 25
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ger Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.833∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗
(3.55) (4.38) (3.60)
Rel.debt.innov.Ger -0.0000131 -0.0000171 -0.0000665∗∗∗ -0.0000362∗∗ -0.0000141 -0.00000471
(-0.34) (-0.65) (-3.57) (-2.11) (-0.81) (-0.21)
Debt.US 0.0000275∗∗∗ 0.0000310∗∗∗ 0.0000256∗∗∗ 0.0000409∗∗∗ -0.00000887 0.0000101∗∗
(8.29) (10.89) (5.86) (8.03) (-1.30) (2.26)
Debt.Ger -0.000216∗∗∗ -0.000267∗∗∗ -0.000238∗∗∗ -0.000287∗∗∗ -0.000421∗∗∗ -0.000326∗∗∗
(-6.63) (-9.40) (-5.38) (-9.26) (-9.45) (-7.44)
(i*-i) Germany 1.522∗∗∗ 2.707∗∗∗ 1.742∗∗∗
(5.15) (6.37) (9.48)
Constant 0.235∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 1.227∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(4.04) (5.94) (2.17) (2.55) (8.01) (3.97)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
60
Figure 36: Equation 10a. Italy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ita
(r*-r) Italy -0.607+ -1.055∗∗∗ 0.372
(-1.93) (-5.57) (1.23)
(i*-i) Italy -0.883+ -1.577∗∗∗ 0.698+
(-1.91) (-3.73) (1.95)
Constant 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ -0.0114 0.00335
(2.71) (2.68) (4.11) (3.41) (-0.50) (0.17)
Observations 63 65 43 45 23 25
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ita Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.767∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(4.36) (4.59) (3.62)
Rel.debt.innov.Ita -0.0000296 -0.0000178 -0.0000748∗∗∗ -0.0000432∗∗ -0.0000389∗∗ -0.0000197
(-0.76) (-0.68) (-4.83) (-2.71) (-2.13) (-1.08)
Debt.US 0.0000351∗∗∗ 0.0000360∗∗∗ 0.0000363∗∗∗ 0.0000367∗∗∗ 0.0000192∗∗∗ 0.0000213∗∗∗
(10.89) (19.03) (13.42) (6.19) (4.46) (5.17)
Debt.Ita -0.000350∗∗∗ -0.000357∗∗∗ -0.000380∗∗∗ -0.000339∗∗∗ -0.000351∗∗∗ -0.000288∗∗∗
(-10.73) (-15.34) (-9.95) (-9.31) (-8.23) (-6.01)
(i*-i) Italy 1.000∗∗∗ 0.837+ 0.920∗∗∗
(4.74) (2.00) (3.46)
Constant 0.497∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗
(9.69) (11.27) (5.82) (3.84) (7.01) (2.44)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
61
Figure 37: Equation 10a. Japan.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Jap
(r*-r) Japan -0.248 -0.589∗∗∗ 0.462
(-1.03) (-2.97) (1.70)
(i*-i) Japan -0.396 -2.014∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗
(-0.78) (-2.07) (4.20)
Constant -0.108∗∗ -0.114∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.0915 -0.0896∗∗∗ -0.0364
(-2.63) (-2.18) (2.95) (1.64) (-3.35) (-1.30)
Observations 63 64 43 44 23 24
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2005.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2010.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Jap Exp.exc.ret.post2015.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.370∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗
(2.88) (4.12) (2.69)
Rel.debt.innov.Jap -0.0000128 -0.00000569 -0.0000195 -0.0000114 -0.0000154∗∗ -0.00000438
(-1.03) (-0.53) (-1.40) (-1.45) (-2.52) (-0.72)
Debt.US 0.0000368∗∗∗ 0.0000362∗∗∗ 0.0000373∗∗∗ 0.0000486∗∗∗ 0.00000802 0.00000826∗∗
(11.83) (12.47) (9.43) (13.06) (1.67) (2.74)
Debt.Jap -0.000110∗∗∗ -0.000112∗∗∗ -0.000108∗∗∗ -0.000101∗∗∗ -0.000109∗∗∗ -0.0000928∗∗∗
(-12.29) (-12.73) (-10.05) (-19.09) (-14.89) (-9.79)
(i*-i) Japan 0.569∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(2.44) (6.93) (4.90)
Constant 0.405∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(5.03) (4.94) (4.39) (4.44) (13.30) (11.60)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 38: Equation 10a. UK.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2005.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2010.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2010.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2015.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2015.UK
(r*-r) UK -0.373+ -0.448∗∗ -0.184
(-1.98) (-2.38) (-0.77)
(i*-i) UK -0.688+ -1.375∗∗∗ -0.433
(-1.91) (-4.00) (-0.74)
Constant 0.131∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0177 0.0121 0.0488∗∗ 0.0442+
(6.76) (7.06) (1.21) (0.90) (2.72) (1.74)
Observations 63 64 43 44 23 24
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp.exc.ret.post2005.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2005.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2010.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2010.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2015.UK Exp.exc.ret.post2015.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.236 0.196 0.379∗∗∗
(1.36) (1.20) (3.39)
Rel.debt.innov.UK 0.0000659 0.0000485 -0.0000286 -0.0000367 0.00000473 -0.00000810
(1.26) (1.03) (-1.68) (-1.61) (0.17) (-0.23)
Debt.US 0.0000311∗∗∗ 0.0000391∗∗∗ 0.0000277∗∗∗ 0.0000417∗∗∗ 0.00000700+ 0.0000120∗∗∗
(3.70) (4.44) (5.53) (3.59) (1.99) (2.99)
Debt.UK -0.000172∗∗∗ -0.000200∗∗∗ -0.000237∗∗∗ -0.000307∗∗∗ -0.000438∗∗∗ -0.000385∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-3.88) (-5.41) (-4.69) (-6.80) (-6.10)
(i*-i) UK 1.105∗∗∗ 1.640+ 0.600∗∗
(3.05) (1.90) (2.33)
Constant 0.00228 -0.0609 0.0936+ 0.0292 0.963∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗
(0.04) (-1.21) (1.71) (0.47) (5.13) (4.31)
Observations 63 63 43 43 23 23
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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ρt+j = ζj + βj(r̂
∗
t − r̂t) + φjdebtt + u
j
t (12a)
Comparing 12 and 12a for the first 12 quarters, the βjs coefficients are still
positive, but lose a lot of significance in the 4 variable VECM. Adding debt
variables, βjs coefficients gain back some significance. US debt’s coefficients
are positive (not significant only for Italy), Foreign debt’s coefficients are nega-
tive. Relative debt innovations’ coefficients are only significant and positive for
Canada and UK.
In terms of magnitude, 1 trillion change in relative debt innovations and US
debt has a single digit percentage effect, while the effect of Foreign debt range
from decimal percentage to double digit percentage.
Figure 39: Equation 12. Canada.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Can Exc.ret.t+2.Can Exc.ret.t+3.Can Exc.ret.t+4.Can Exc.ret.t+5.Can Exc.ret.t+6.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.193∗∗ 0.102 0.189 0.136 0.155 0.335∗∗
(2.02) (0.89) (1.33) (0.88) (1.01) (2.05)
Constant 0.00530 0.00675 0.00760 0.00974 0.0113 0.0117
(0.87) (0.71) (0.59) (0.60) (0.58) (0.53)
Observations 87 86 85 84 83 82
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Can Exc.ret.t+8.Can Exc.ret.t+9.Can Exc.ret.t+10.Can Exc.ret.t+11.Can Exc.ret.t+12.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.197 0.200 0.146 0.216 0.209 0.220
(1.06) (0.91) (0.65) (0.95) (0.94) (0.98)
Constant 0.0142 0.0161 0.0187 0.0209 0.0240 0.0269
(0.57) (0.59) (0.63) (0.65) (0.70) (0.73)
Observations 81 80 79 78 77 76
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 40: Equation 12a. Canada.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Can Exc.ret.t+2.Can Exc.ret.t+3.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.161 0.0585 0.184
(1.62) (0.57) (1.38)
Rel.debt.innov.Can 0.0000590∗∗ 0.000109∗∗∗ 0.0000949∗∗
(2.40) (3.02) (2.33)
Debt.Can -0.0000212 -0.0000744 -0.000136+
(-0.52) (-1.16) (-1.76)
Debt.US -0.000000793 0.000000299 0.00000289
(-0.33) (0.08) (0.61)
Constant 0.0248 0.0572+ 0.0914∗∗
(1.09) (1.79) (2.27)
Observations 87 86 85
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.Can Exc.ret.t+5.Can Exc.ret.t+6.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.162 0.198 0.403∗∗∗
(1.22) (1.54) (2.95)
Rel.debt.innov.Can 0.000113∗∗ 0.000153∗∗∗ 0.000176∗∗∗
(2.54) (2.89) (3.25)
Debt.Can -0.000231∗∗ -0.000295∗∗∗ -0.000371∗∗∗
(-2.33) (-2.70) (-3.31)
Debt.US 0.00000724 0.00000909 0.0000117+
(1.19) (1.38) (1.72)
Constant 0.134∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(2.73) (3.10) (3.60)
Observations 84 83 82
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 41: Equation 12a. Canada.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.Can Exc.ret.t+8.Can Exc.ret.t+9.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.293∗∗ 0.332+ 0.314∗∗
(2.07) (1.94) (2.08)
Rel.debt.innov.Can 0.000169∗∗∗ 0.000174∗∗∗ 0.000191∗∗∗
(3.17) (2.83) (2.84)
Debt.Can -0.000428∗∗∗ -0.000514∗∗∗ -0.000588∗∗∗
(-3.93) (-4.58) (-5.08)
Debt.US 0.0000142∗∗ 0.0000179∗∗∗ 0.0000206∗∗∗
(2.30) (2.90) (3.26)
Constant 0.241∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(3.65) (4.01) (4.34)
Observations 81 80 79
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.Can Exc.ret.t+11.Can Exc.ret.t+12.Can
(r*-r) Canada 0.430∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(3.09) (3.55) (3.54)
Rel.debt.innov.Can 0.000193∗∗∗ 0.000153∗∗ 0.000146∗∗
(2.82) (2.42) (2.48)
Debt.Can -0.000668∗∗∗ -0.000728∗∗∗ -0.000770∗∗∗
(-6.27) (-6.40) (-6.68)
Debt.US 0.0000245∗∗∗ 0.0000270∗∗∗ 0.0000282∗∗∗
(4.45) (4.64) (4.87)
Constant 0.359∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(4.75) (4.95) (5.21)
Observations 78 77 76
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 42: Equation 12. France.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Fran Exc.ret.t+2.Fra Exc.ret.t+3.Fra Exc.ret.t+4.Fra Exc.ret.t+5.Fra Exc.ret.t+6.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.618∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.615∗∗ 0.703∗∗ 0.795∗∗ 0.745+
(3.60) (2.22) (2.23) (2.26) (2.27) (1.88)
Constant 0.000155 0.00292 0.00702 0.0110 0.0140 0.0158
(0.02) (0.22) (0.41) (0.54) (0.61) (0.62)
Observations 76 76 75 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Fra Exc.ret.t+8.Fra Exc.ret.t+9.Fra Exc.ret.t+10.Fra Exc.ret.t+11.Fra Exc.ret.t+12.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.665 0.725 0.723 0.796+ 0.901∗∗ 0.929∗∗
(1.49) (1.48) (1.49) (1.76) (2.17) (2.13)
Constant 0.0166 0.0177 0.0183 0.0192 0.0199 0.0205
(0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62)
Observations 71 70 69 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 43: Equation 12a. France.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Fran Exc.ret.t+2.Fra Exc.ret.t+3.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.490∗∗ 0.360 0.420∗∗
(2.58) (1.55) (2.07)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000138 0.0000436 0.0000419
(0.47) (0.94) (0.77)
Debt.Fra -0.0000573∗∗ -0.000118∗∗∗ -0.000180∗∗∗
(-2.47) (-3.27) (-4.37)
Debt.US 0.00000218 0.00000630 0.0000114∗∗
(0.70) (1.38) (2.05)
Constant 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(3.69) (4.46) (6.13)
Observations 76 76 75
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.Fra Exc.ret.t+5.Fra Exc.ret.t+6.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.513∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗
(2.50) (2.83) (2.61)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000426 0.0000311 0.0000260
(0.94) (0.77) (0.67)
Debt.Fra -0.000236∗∗∗ -0.000267∗∗∗ -0.000291∗∗∗
(-5.32) (-5.71) (-5.96)
Debt.US 0.0000162∗∗∗ 0.0000189∗∗∗ 0.0000198∗∗∗
(2.66) (3.17) (3.24)
Constant 0.279∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(7.47) (7.58) (8.05)
Observations 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 44: Equation 12a. France.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.Fra Exc.ret.t+8.Fra Exc.ret.t+9.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.452+ 0.478+ 0.468
(1.95) (1.80) (1.61)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000226 0.0000488 0.0000540
(0.55) (1.05) (1.00)
Debt.Fra -0.000319∗∗∗ -0.000358∗∗∗ -0.000377∗∗∗
(-6.48) (-7.69) (-7.89)
Debt.US 0.0000217∗∗∗ 0.0000252∗∗∗ 0.0000263∗∗∗
(3.46) (4.33) (4.40)
Constant 0.388∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(8.63) (9.20) (9.31)
Observations 71 70 69
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.Fra Exc.ret.t+11.Fra Exc.ret.t+12.Fra
(r*-r) France 0.582∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.93) (3.76)
Rel.debt.innov.Fra 0.0000455 0.0000157 -0.00000488
(0.81) (0.33) (-0.12)
Debt.Fra -0.000397∗∗∗ -0.000396∗∗∗ -0.000396∗∗∗
(-8.27) (-7.92) (-8.35)
Debt.US 0.0000282∗∗∗ 0.0000283∗∗∗ 0.0000279∗∗∗
(4.77) (4.77) (5.07)
Constant 0.463∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(9.53) (9.53) (9.99)
Observations 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 45: Equation 12. Germany.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Germ Exc.ret.t+2.Ger Exc.ret.t+3.Ger Exc.ret.t+4.Ger Exc.ret.t+5.Ger Exc.ret.t+6.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.609∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.605∗∗ 0.697∗∗ 0.786∗∗ 0.738+
(3.59) (2.27) (2.20) (2.25) (2.28) (1.90)
Constant 0.0000944 0.00298 0.00694 0.0109 0.0140 0.0158
(0.01) (0.23) (0.40) (0.53) (0.61) (0.63)
Observations 76 76 75 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Ger Exc.ret.t+8.Ger Exc.ret.t+9.Ger Exc.ret.t+10.Ger Exc.ret.t+11.Ger Exc.ret.t+12.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.649 0.710 0.701 0.777+ 0.871∗∗ 0.907∗∗
(1.48) (1.47) (1.47) (1.76) (2.13) (2.12)
Constant 0.0165 0.0177 0.0183 0.0192 0.0199 0.0204
(0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62)
Observations 71 70 69 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 46: Equation 12a. Germany.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Germ Exc.ret.t+2.Ger Exc.ret.t+3.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.471∗∗ 0.351 0.392+
(2.31) (1.44) (1.87)
Rel.debt.innov.Ger 0.00000981 0.0000418 0.0000455
(0.32) (0.88) (0.84)
Debt.Ger -0.0000269 -0.0000624∗∗ -0.0000999∗∗∗
(-1.61) (-2.41) (-3.14)
Debt.US -0.00000222 -0.00000234 -0.00000158
(-1.04) (-0.81) (-0.44)
Constant 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(3.00) (3.73) (4.94)
Observations 76 76 75
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.Ger Exc.ret.t+5.Ger Exc.ret.t+6.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.490∗∗ 0.611∗∗ 0.548∗∗
(2.41) (2.65) (2.38)
Rel.debt.innov.Ger 0.0000502 0.0000345 0.0000288
(1.17) (0.93) (0.86)
Debt.Ger -0.000135∗∗∗ -0.000159∗∗∗ -0.000178∗∗∗
(-3.84) (-4.28) (-4.59)
Debt.US -0.000000445 0.000000808 0.000000693
(-0.11) (0.20) (0.16)
Constant 0.313∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(5.99) (6.31) (6.71)
Observations 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 47: Equation 12a. Germany.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.Ger Exc.ret.t+8.Ger Exc.ret.t+9.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.451+ 0.470 0.430
(1.74) (1.58) (1.41)
Rel.debt.innov.Ger 0.0000251 0.0000523 0.0000654
(0.65) (1.05) (1.18)
Debt.Ger -0.000197∗∗∗ -0.000225∗∗∗ -0.000243∗∗∗
(-4.92) (-5.54) (-5.79)
Debt.US 0.000000995 0.00000228 0.00000282
(0.22) (0.52) (0.61)
Constant 0.448∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗
(7.06) (7.51) (7.77)
Observations 71 70 69
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.Ger Exc.ret.t+11.Ger Exc.ret.t+12.Ger
(r*-r) Germany 0.535+ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(1.96) (2.73) (3.69)
Rel.debt.innov.Ger 0.0000589 0.0000272 0.00000566
(1.07) (0.60) (0.16)
Debt.Ger -0.000262∗∗∗ -0.000269∗∗∗ -0.000279∗∗∗
(-6.11) (-6.58) (-7.52)
Debt.US 0.00000426 0.00000568 0.00000662+
(0.92) (1.38) (1.85)
Constant 0.553∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗
(8.12) (8.52) (9.52)
Observations 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 48: Equation 12. Italy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1)Ita Exc.ret.t+2.Ita Exc.ret.t+3.Ita Exc.ret.t+4.Ita Exc.ret.t+5.Ita Exc.ret.t+6.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.621∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗ 0.611∗∗ 0.692∗∗ 0.793∗∗ 0.742+
(3.61) (2.25) (2.21) (2.22) (2.28) (1.88)
Constant 0.000160 0.00296 0.00702 0.0110 0.0141 0.0158
(0.02) (0.23) (0.41) (0.53) (0.61) (0.62)
Observations 76 76 75 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Ita Exc.ret.t+8.Ita Exc.ret.t+9.Ita Exc.ret.t+10.Ita Exc.ret.t+11.Ita Exc.ret.t+12.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.664 0.715 0.712 0.771+ 0.881∗∗ 0.918∗∗
(1.50) (1.47) (1.47) (1.69) (2.10) (2.10)
Constant 0.0166 0.0177 0.0183 0.0191 0.0199 0.0205
(0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62)
Observations 71 70 69 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 49: Equation 12a. Italy.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1)Ita Exc.ret.t+2.Ita Exc.ret.t+3.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.476∗∗ 0.313 0.325
(2.57) (1.35) (1.52)
Rel.debt.innov.Ita 0.0000112 0.0000412 0.0000440
(0.39) (0.90) (0.82)
Debt.Ita -0.0000553∗∗∗ -0.000108∗∗∗ -0.000161∗∗∗
(-2.81) (-3.45) (-4.68)
Debt.US -9.30e-08 0.00000107 0.00000304
(-0.04) (0.33) (0.76)
Constant 0.129∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(3.96) (4.49) (6.38)
Observations 76 76 75
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.Ita Exc.ret.t+5.Ita Exc.ret.t+6.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.380+ 0.477∗∗ 0.406∗∗
(1.70) (2.04) (2.02)
Rel.debt.innov.Ita 0.0000460 0.0000352 0.0000273
(1.06) (0.96) (0.79)
Debt.Ita -0.000206∗∗∗ -0.000232∗∗∗ -0.000252∗∗∗
(-5.96) (-6.46) (-7.16)
Debt.US 0.00000479 0.00000598 0.00000576
(1.15) (1.49) (1.46)
Constant 0.428∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(8.27) (8.73) (9.83)
Observations 74 73 72
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 50: Equation 12a. Italy.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.Ita Exc.ret.t+8.Ita Exc.ret.t+9.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.303 0.301 0.267
(1.47) (1.24) (0.98)
Rel.debt.innov.Ita 0.0000300 0.0000517 0.0000637
(0.76) (1.10) (1.15)
Debt.Ita -0.000277∗∗∗ -0.000305∗∗∗ -0.000321∗∗∗
(-8.13) (-9.58) (-9.26)
Debt.US 0.00000624 0.00000727+ 0.00000732+
(1.52) (1.87) (1.74)
Constant 0.587∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(10.99) (11.80) (11.54)
Observations 71 70 69
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.Ita Exc.ret.t+11.Ita Exc.ret.t+12.Ita
(r*-r) Italy 0.357 0.550∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(1.32) (2.08) (2.94)
Rel.debt.innov.Ita 0.0000583 0.0000248 -0.00000627
(1.07) (0.54) (-0.16)
Debt.Ita -0.000331∗∗∗ -0.000323∗∗∗ -0.000319∗∗∗
(-8.90) (-7.89) (-8.29)
Debt.US 0.00000747+ 0.00000710 0.00000671+
(1.76) (1.65) (1.68)
Constant 0.693∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(10.94) (9.96) (10.29)
Observations 68 67 66
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
75
Figure 51: Equation 12. Japan.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Jap Exc.ret.t+2.Jap Exc.ret.t+3.Jap Exc.ret.t+4.Jap Exc.ret.t+5.Jap Exc.ret.t+6.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.436∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗ 0.438+ 0.417
(3.24) (3.56) (2.89) (1.99) (1.70) (1.48)
Constant -0.0335∗∗∗ -0.0260+ -0.0255 -0.0315 -0.0333 -0.0344
(-4.03) (-1.96) (-1.38) (-1.39) (-1.26) (-1.15)
Observations 85 84 83 82 81 80
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.Jap Exc.ret.t+8.Jap Exc.ret.t+9.Jap Exc.ret.t+10.Jap Exc.ret.t+11.Jap Exc.ret.t+12.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.369 0.233 0.147 0.0817 -0.0461 -0.207
(1.16) (0.72) (0.44) (0.22) (-0.13) (-0.57)
Constant -0.0374 -0.0452 -0.0490 -0.0512 -0.0577 -0.0656
(-1.12) (-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.53)
Observations 79 78 77 76 75 74
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 52: Equation 12a. Japan.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1) Jap Exc.ret.t+2.Jap Exc.ret.t+3.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.308∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(2.28) (3.87) (3.87)
Rel.debt.innov.Jap 0.00000999 0.0000175 -0.00000820
(0.67) (1.34) (-0.53)
Debt.Jap 0.00000413 -0.0000121 -0.0000217
(0.48) (-0.92) (-1.38)
Debt.US 0.00000199 0.00000530 0.00000773
(0.62) (1.15) (1.40)
Constant -0.0998∗∗ 0.00888 0.0691
(-2.16) (0.14) (0.92)
Observations 85 84 83
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.Jap Exc.ret.t+5.Jap Exc.ret.t+6.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.644∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
(3.07) (3.10) (3.39)
Rel.debt.innov.Jap -0.0000215 -0.00000932 -0.00000535
(-1.01) (-0.40) (-0.23)
Debt.Jap -0.0000309+ -0.0000427∗∗ -0.0000531∗∗∗
(-1.76) (-2.32) (-2.97)
Debt.US 0.0000108+ 0.0000140∗∗ 0.0000168∗∗∗
(1.76) (2.19) (2.70)
Constant 0.108 0.168+ 0.223∗∗
(1.26) (1.80) (2.40)
Observations 82 81 80
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 53: Equation 12a. Japan.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.Jap Exc.ret.t+8.Jap Exc.ret.t+9.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.736∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗ 0.586∗∗
(3.01) (2.54) (2.48)
Rel.debt.innov.Jap -0.0000129 -0.00000303 -0.00000370
(-0.49) (-0.10) (-0.11)
Debt.Jap -0.0000612∗∗∗ -0.0000675∗∗∗ -0.0000773∗∗∗
(-3.40) (-3.31) (-3.64)
Debt.US 0.0000191∗∗∗ 0.0000214∗∗∗ 0.0000242∗∗∗
(3.13) (3.37) (3.74)
Constant 0.265∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.330∗∗
(2.70) (2.37) (2.61)
Observations 79 78 77
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.Jap Exc.ret.t+11.Jap Exc.ret.t+12.Jap
(r*-r) Japan 0.587∗∗ 0.463+ 0.322
(2.33) (1.70) (1.21)
Rel.debt.innov.Jap -0.00000250 0.00000304 0.00000357
(-0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
Debt.Jap -0.0000869∗∗∗ -0.0000915∗∗∗ -0.0000967∗∗∗
(-4.00) (-3.76) (-3.94)
Debt.US 0.0000267∗∗∗ 0.0000285∗∗∗ 0.0000307∗∗∗
(3.99) (3.94) (4.19)
Constant 0.381∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(3.08) (2.77) (2.86)
Observations 76 75 74
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 54: Equation 12. United Kingdom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.(t+1) UK Exc.ret.t+2.UK Exc.ret.t+3.UK Exc.ret.t+4.UK Exc.ret.t+5.UK Exc.ret.t+6.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.341 0.367 0.441+ 0.485+ 0.561+ 0.654+
(1.46) (1.32) (1.72) (1.71) (1.92) (1.95)
Constant 0.0110 0.00904 0.00725 0.00472 0.000215 -0.00392
(1.30) (0.75) (0.48) (0.26) (0.01) (-0.16)
Observations 76 75 74 73 72 71
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc.ret.t+7.UK Exc.ret.t+8.UK Exc.ret.t+9.UK Exc.ret.t+10.UK Exc.ret.t+11.UK Exc.ret.t+12.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.697+ 0.787+ 0.987∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗ 1.285∗∗
(1.88) (1.87) (2.16) (2.65) (2.47) (2.36)
Constant -0.00819 -0.0139 -0.0220 -0.0296 -0.0338 -0.0426
(-0.31) (-0.49) (-0.72) (-0.96) (-1.05) (-1.25)
Observations 70 69 68 67 66 65
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 55: Equation 12a. United Kingdom.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.(t+1) UK Exc.ret.t+2.UK Exc.ret.t+3.UK
(r*-r) UK -0.0546 -0.0456 0.0657
(-0.27) (-0.21) (0.49)
Rel.debt.innov.UK 0.0000360+ 0.0000252 0.0000122
(1.96) (0.60) (0.27)
Debt.UK -0.0000338 -0.0000899∗∗ -0.000157∗∗
(-1.25) (-2.06) (-2.55)
Debt.US -0.00000359 0.00000266 0.0000112
(-0.95) (0.45) (1.27)
Constant 0.113∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(5.18) (5.70) (4.80)
Observations 76 75 74
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+4.UK Exc.ret.t+5.UK Exc.ret.t+6.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.0447 0.114 0.235
(0.38) (0.74) (0.95)
Rel.debt.innov.UK 0.0000339 0.0000405 0.0000429
(1.05) (1.29) (1.35)
Debt.UK -0.000222∗∗∗ -0.000263∗∗∗ -0.000311∗∗∗
(-2.72) (-2.70) (-2.95)
Debt.US 0.0000188 0.0000239 0.0000305+
(1.56) (1.60) (1.84)
Constant 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(3.68) (2.68) (2.06)
Observations 73 72 71
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 56: Equation 12a. United Kingdom.
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+7.UK Exc.ret.t+8.UK Exc.ret.t+9.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.291 0.324 0.532
(0.96) (0.90) (1.32)
Rel.debt.innov.UK 0.0000283 0.0000517 0.0000785
(0.78) (1.19) (1.57)
Debt.UK -0.000367∗∗∗ -0.000421∗∗∗ -0.000467∗∗∗
(-3.25) (-3.56) (-3.72)
Debt.US 0.0000386∗∗ 0.0000457∗∗ 0.0000527∗∗
(2.11) (2.31) (2.54)
Constant 0.131+ 0.128 0.107
(1.71) (1.49) (1.17)
Observations 70 69 68
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Exc.ret.t+10.UK Exc.ret.t+11.UK Exc.ret.t+12.UK
(r*-r) UK 0.849∗∗ 0.801+ 0.899+
(2.02) (1.92) (1.96)
Rel.debt.innov.UK 0.0000456 0.0000319 0.0000568
(0.82) (0.60) (1.23)
Debt.UK -0.000501∗∗∗ -0.000509∗∗∗ -0.000523∗∗∗
(-3.85) (-3.97) (-4.17)
Debt.US 0.0000595∗∗∗ 0.0000604∗∗∗ 0.0000627∗∗∗
(2.81) (2.89) (3.08)
Constant 0.0771 0.0785 0.0640
(0.80) (0.78) (0.63)
Observations 67 66 65
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2 Chapter 2. Government Bonds and the Ex-
change Rate in EZ-BKK model.
2.1 Introduction
Exchange rates have been studied for decades with different angles: from deter-
mination of the levels for demand of traded goods (based on Dornbusch (1976)
and Mundell-Fleming) to resolution of puzzles (see review essays by Engel (1996,
2014) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Ishtoki and Mukhin (2017) ).
Two of the puzzles are referred to as the uncovered interest parity (UIP) , both
in classic and new form. The classic UIP puzzle finds that there is positive cor-
relation between high interest rate countries and excess currency returns. This
happens at frequencies between six or more hours13 and quarters for low infla-
tion countries and does not happen for long term bonds (Chinn and Meredith
(2004)).
The new UIP puzzle has been documented by Engel (2016) and Valchev(2020)
and recently discussed by Favaretto(2021). After an initial positive correlation,
there is a reversal between interest rates and excess currency returns.
Part of the literature considers the role of liquidity or convenience into play in
order to explain these puzzles. Intuitively, short-term bonds that are safe and
liquid give an additional benefit to interest rate returns. High value from liq-
uidity is referred as high convenience yield of a bond and it may vary depending
on the demand and supply of safe and liquid government bonds.
This paper focuses on the replication of the classic UIP puzzle using a model
with recursive preferences and Long Run Risks. Previously, a similar endow-
ment economy model from Colacito and Croce (2013) showed that the UIP
puzzle may be replicated by Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) dynamics. The
same is not true for a production economy model within the same class of mod-
els (Colacito et al (2018), from now on CCHH).
This paper augments a production based LRR model (CCHH) with government
bonds. These government bonds are assumed to be out of control from the social
planner and only subjects to exogenous shocks.14 They take up real resources in
the budget constraint and deliver convenience yields to consumers. Accordingly,
convenience yields fluctuations impact the exchange rate autonomously respect
to the risk part.
The model is a EZ-BKK model: infinite horizon, two good, two countries BKK
(Backus et al (1992, 1993)) with Home Bias in consumption, recursive prefer-
ences and permanent news shocks to growth rate of productivity. Within this
framework, positive long run news shock to Home implies a net outflow of re-
sources to Foreign under preferences for early resolution of uncertainty. Indeed
this happens for the predominance of the risk sharing channel between Home
and Foreign over the productivity channel, implying positive domestic net ex-
ports until the actual productivity news is materialized. The same is not true
13Chaboud and Wright (2005) finds that below six hours, classic UIP actually holds well.”
14This feature is a consequence to the difficulty of solving the recursive preference’s Pareto
problem with bonds.
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for a positive short run shock to Home since it implies an immediate prevalence
of the productivity channel that implies higher inflow of capital and negative
net exports 15.
I study what are the conditions for the emergence of the UIP puzzle under
this setup. The UIP puzzle does not emerge under temporary bond shocks and
the CCHH parametrization. The UIP puzzle is replicated for temporary bond
shocks under a nearly doubled standard deviation of short term shocks. Under
permanent bond shocks, the UIP puzzle is replicated with CCHH parametriza-
tion only if there is a positive correlation between Home long-run shocks and
bond shocks.
The expected change in exchange rate is defined here by the typical risk com-
ponent i.e. differences in interest rates and an additional liquidity component
i.e. the convenience yield part.
Positive long-run news shock to Home productivity increase the difference be-
tween Home and Foreign risk-free interest rates as the risk sharing channel
dominates the productivity channel under preferences for early resolution of
uncertainty and Home bias in consumption. This has a little positive effect also
on the second component of the expected change in exchange rate that depends
on convenience yields 16.
Positive shock to Home bonds increase the difference between Home and For-
eign risk-free interest rates due to the additional multiplicative component in the
SDF of both countries, while at the same time lowering the second component
of expected change in exchange rate. Indeed the convenience yield difference
shrinks due to lower marginal effect of additional Home bond holdings. The
overall effect balances out to replicate the classic UIP puzzle depending on how
frequent and strong are the two opposing channels.
I report UIP puzzle coefficients and the Confidence Intervals at 95 % probability
for six scenarios, four under permanent shocks and changing covariances, two
for temporary shocks and changing covariances.
I show IRFs for the baseline model and comparison of IRFs between three inter-
esting cases for 11 variables: the baseline case with positive covariance between
long-run news shock and bond shocks, then adding a positive covariance between
short-run productivity shocks and bond shocks, and finally almost doubling the
standard deviation of short run shocks.
I report in the appendix the full list of parameters, variables and first order
conditions used in the model. Moreover, the appendix shows the full IRFs for
CCHH (2018).
Section 2 outlines the literature review on the topic, Section 3 outlines the
model, Section 4 shows the results and Section 5 concludes.
15These shocks are identified by regressing Solow residuals on price-dividend ratios.
16This is why this mechanism alone is not able to replicate the UIP puzzle.
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2.2 Literature review
This paper builds heavily on work done by CCHH(2018). They develop a EZ-
BKK model that uses a BKK approach and adds Epstein-Zin preferences (recur-
sive preferences) and long run risks (LRR), introduced in international macroe-
conomics and finance for explaining a number of puzzles such as the low risk free
interest rates, the high equity premium and so on (Bansal and Yaron (2004)).
They study how long run and short run growth news impacts investment flows
among G7 countries and show that an EZ-BKK model is consistent with data
such that positive long-run news for domestic productivity induces a net outflow
of investments, while short-run news do the opposite.
My approach adds government bonds as exogenous processes and assumes that
these bonds give a liquidity convenience yield effect to the consumers in the
economy.
In this setup, short-run and long-run shocks are respectively one period perma-
nent innovations of the growth rate of productivity and multiple periods ones
(Favilukis and Lin (2013)). These shocks are identified by regressing Solow resid-
uals on lagged country-specific price-dividend ratios, in the spirit of Bansal,Kiku,
Yaron (2016) and Colacito and Croce (2011).
This paper follows CCHH in using Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988)
preferences to bundle consumption and leisure to adress the critique by Raffo
(2008): GHH preferences prevent term of trade adjustment , so that counter-
cyclical trade balance comes from adjustment in quantity traded. Colacito and
Croce (2013) use a two-country, two good endowment economy with Epstein-
Zin preferences and complete markets to show how the classic UIP puzzle and
the Backus Smith puzzle may be generated. CC(2013) shows that introducing
recursive preferences and growth news about endowment shocks implies that
positive long-run endowment shocks to Home lower consumption today to have
less variance of continuation utility, thus reproducing higher relative interest
rate in Home together with an expected appreciation of Home. Similar models
with a production side failed to explain the UIP puzzle, probably lacking the
increase in variance that an endowment shock implies.
Introducing a convenience part inside the utility function is equivalent to intro-
ducing a transaction cost component. Walsh (2017, ch2 and 3) details that it
is similar to introducing a time-varying wedge inside the Euler equation. In my
setup, transaction costs are real costs since there are no sticky prices or money
balances.
There is a vast literature that studied how asset pricing facts may be reproduced
by macroeconomic models. Boldrin et al (2001) generate equity premium and
low risk free rate in a one country model with internal habit consumption and
lack of perfect capital reallocation between two sectors of the economy. Ulhig
(2007) achieves a lower degree of consumption smoothing across countries by
having a one country model with external habits in consumption, adjustment
costs for capital and real wage rigidity. Croce (2014) is able to reproduce the
equity risk premium in a one country model with recursive preferences, a pro-
duction economy and convex adjustment costs for capital.
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The literature review on the UIP puzzles is big and expanding. For somewhat
comprehensive review, see Engel (1996) and Engel (2014).
The Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle in its classical form has been introduced
by Fama (1984): defining st =
Home
Foreign as log nominal ER (↑ st means Home
depreciate), a typical Fama regression:
st+1 − st = α+ β(it − i∗t ) + εt+1
Data suggests that β̂ < 0 instead of β = 1, i.e. high interest rates countries see
overtime an appreciation of currency up to quarter time frequency.
There are two papers that define the new UIP puzzle and propose a convenience
yield-liquidity explanation to both UIP puzzles: Engel (2016) and Valchev
(2020). Valchev (2020) uses panel data to find empirical evidence of conve-
nience yields’ importance for the classic and new UIP. He also builds a theoreti-
cal model with endogenous convenience yields’ fluctuations that replicates both
the classic UIP puzzle and the new one.
Ishtoki and Mukhin (2017) explain 6 exchange rate puzzles by using a setup
that blends international asset demand shocks with a framework that makes
these shocks propagates very little within the pair of countries. In their paper,
shocks propagates little because of Home bias in consumption, weak substitu-
ability between domestic and foreign goods (little variance of Terms of Trade)
and strategic complementarities in price setting. They find that an increase
in the demand for Foreign assets decreases the ex-ante foreign currency excess
returns.
Lately convenience yields and liquidity have been growingly incorporated in in-
ternational macroeconomics and finance. Among the contributions, the paper
by Krishnamurty and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) finds that when debt to GDP
ratio is low, Treasuries are more scarce and there is higher convenience yield.
This implies that supply of government bonds impacts convenience yields such
that higher supply decreases them.
There are models that use the idea of bond convenience yields for closed econ-
omy asset puzzles, as Bansal and Coleman (1996) and Lagos (2010). The idea is
that certain assets give an additional benefit other than the bare interest rate.
Jiang et al (2018) build a theory that links demand for foreign safe assets and
the nominal exchange rate for US. They claim to solve most of the exchange
rate disconnect puzzle for the US by defining a specific form of convenience
yield. By defining as convenience yield the different yield between foreign gov-
ernment bonds and US bonds, they show that an increase in this convenience
yield implies an impact appreciation of the dollar and a following depreciation
that increases the ex-ante foreign currency excess return.
Engel and Wu (2019) find that accounting for liquidity yield on government
bonds gives explanatory power to monetary shocks and price differences, differ-
ently from what the literature on forecasting and exchange rate disconnect had
previously found.
Du et al (2018) study convenience yields for G10 currencies between 2000 and
2016. The US treasury premium is defined as the convenience yield on US trea-
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sury bonds minus the convenience yield on foreign treasury bonds, such that a
positive premium implies that US convenience yield is higher than foreign. They
find that there are country-pair treasury premia with different average and dy-
namics. Treasury premia at 3 month horizon are higher than 5 year horizon,
and they both increased during the Global Financial Crisis with higher jump
by the 3 month premia. Moreover, there has been a steady decline in treasury
premia after the GFC for the currencies considered.
Van Bisbergen et al (2019) use a new methodology to estimate risk-free rates
between 2004 and 2018, using the put-call parity relationship for European style
options. By this method, they get risk-free rates from risky assets and compare
them to risk- free rates on government bonds. The difference is indeed the
convenience yield. As Du et al (2018), they find higher convenience yields at
short term rather than long term horizon (65 versus 40 basis point) and strongly
varying in time of financial distress.
Moreover they find that a forecasting factor constructed from cross section of
convenience yields (a la Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005) has substantial forecasting
power for both government bond excess returns (conventional risk premia) and
their risk-free rate excess returns (risk premia minus the convenience yields),
even when controlling for other factors of the literature.
Lilley et al (2019) define as “Exchange Rate Reconnect” the fact that after the
GFC , exchange rates correlate with macroeconomic fundamentals according to
both IMF data 17 and a micro datasets with security level data. In particular,
broad US dollar comoves closely with global risk appetite. In addition, only
between 2007-2012 the broad US dollar co-moves also with US foreign bond
purchases, even if they conclude that this correlation is probably caused by the
movement in global risk appetite. The broad dollar and global risk appetite co-
movement seems to depend on the changed relations between dollar and riskier
currencies, such as Australian dollar. When US investors buy less US treasuries
or more domestic corporate debt, the dollar depreciates.
Other approaches to the topic of safe and liquid assets includes Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2017) on the safe asset conundrum and the same authors for
the consequences of this for the growing difference between capital and equity
risk premia.




The model is very close to the CCHH (2018) model and I added the convenience
yield part inside the utility function, the modified expected change in exchange
rate, the government bonds, the shock to bonds. Full parameters and definitions
for the variables are in the Appendix.
The model is an infinite horizon, two-country, two-goods BKK economy with
recursive preferences and new shocks. Being in complete markets, agents trade
a complete set of securities to maximize their utility at time zero.
The Home country utility 18 is:








ψh(BH,BF ) = ψ̄(abBH
ηb−1





ψh∗(BH∗, BF ∗) = ψ̄(abBF





γ is relative risk aversion, ψ is intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES).
Under preferences for early resolution of uncertainty, γ > 1/ψ.
Good X and Y are consumed by both countries via consumption aggrega-










Following the Raffo (2008) critique, there is GHH preferences:








What is not consumed of either goods in both countries is invested in capital












Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt +Gt (23)






18Foreign country variables are often omitted, but when they are inserted they present
asterisks
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Total production in one country is either consumed or invested, but the
government bonds takes a share of the total value of production:
XTt = Xt +X
∗
t + Ix,t + Iy,t +BH +BH
∗ (27)








Defining the utility preferences in a compact way i.e Ut = W (C̃t, Ut+1),
the social planner chooses {Xt, X∗t , Yt, Y ∗t , Nt, N∗t ,Kt,K∗t , Ix,t, Iy,t, I∗x,t, I∗y,t} to
maximize µ0W0+(1−µ0)W ∗0 under the resource constraints and the investment
dynamics 27, 28, 23, 24.
µ0 is the Pareto weight at time-0. The optimality conditions are derived by
Colacito et al. (2018), but here I am outlining the main differences.















































where µt is the date t Pareto weight for Home country.





























+ (1− δk)Q∗k,t+1)] (35)


























































+ (1− δk)Qk,t+1)/Pt+1] (43)
Exogenous processes are:
∆at = µ+ zt−1 − τ log(
At−1
A∗t−1
) + εa,t (44)
∆a∗t = µ+ z
∗
t−1 + τ log(
At−1
A∗t−1
) + ε∗a,t (45)
Levels of productivity processes A and A∗ are cointegrated with speed 0.007 (a
moderate amount).






I modeled shocks to bond so that there is only one shock that drives a wedge
between the ”country” preferred government bonds19.
BHt = ρbBHt−1 + εb,t (48)
19This choice is motivated by the intuition that these shocks matter here only since they
drive a relative bond shock between the two countries.
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BF ∗t = ρbBF
∗
t−1 − εb,t (49)
The expressions ϕt and ϕ
∗
t within the GHH bundles of consumption and
















where θ̂ = 0.1.


























In order to get a sense of the impact of the addition of government bonds, I
make note that in steady state, BH/UC = 0.00033099, BH/Q = 0.00060953,
BH/xaTot = 0.00044183. Moreover, in most of the model simulations, Sigmab/sigmaz =
2.0408 and Sigmab/sigmaa = 0.25974.
Within the Dynare file, C̃t present inside Et[∆et+1] has been approximated by
C̃t/At.
2.4 Results
My simulations show that EZ-BKK models cannot replicate the UIP puzzle 20,
but they do it if government bonds and convenience yields are inserted. Indeed,
permanent shocks to bonds allow a typical parametrization to deliver the UIP
puzzle at the condition of assuming that long-run news shocks and bond shocks
are positively correlated. Under the typical preferences for early resolution of
uncertainty, a positive long-run news to Home allocates more resources into
bonds and at the same time more outflows of resources to Foreign to sustain
consumption.
Both these results emerge from a minimal resource holding by bonds as we
see from the ratio of Home bonds to UC being 0.03% (utility over period one
consumption), the ratio of Home bonds to Q being 0.06% (utility from time
t+ 1 on) and the ratio of Home bonds to Home production being 0.04%.
Being unable to show impulse response functions (IRFs) for permanent shocks,
20See Appendix B for the IRFs of the CCHH model.
90
I report UIP puzzle coefficients and confidence intervals under three different
parametrization 21.
A =
 ρb = 1σa = 0.0385













 ρb = 1σa = 0.0385
















covariance(eb, ez) = 0.00001
















covariance(eb, ez) = 0.00001
covariance(eb, ea) = −0.0001

21These simulations are done without modeling the covariance of Foreign long-run shocks
and the bond shock or the covariance of short-run shocks and the bond shock. Indeed in that












Under temporary bond shocks the only way in which the UIP puzzle is repli-
cable is by having a nearly double standard deviation of short-run shocks under
no other conditions.
E =
 ρb = 0.5σa = 0.05













 ρb = 0.5σa = 0.05













2.4.1 Comparing IRFs: CCHH and baseline model.
In this IRFs comparison, in black my model, in red the CCHH (2018) one.
Changes seem to be minimal for the variables considered.
Figure 57: IRF comparison between CCHH(red) and my model. (1)
Annual deviations from steady state.
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Figure 58: IRF comparison between CCHH(red) and my model. (2)
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 59: IRF comparison between CCHH(red) and my model. (3)
Annual deviations from steady state.
95
Figure 60: IRF comparison between CCHH(red) and my model. (4)
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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2.4.2 Comparing IRFs: baseline with different covariances between
shock processes.
I compare IRFs from the baseline model (specification A above, but ρb = 0.5),
a model with additional positive covariance between long-run news shocks and
short-run shocks (specification C above,but ρb = 0.5) and finally the baseline
model with higher covariance of short-run shocks (specification E from above).
Figure 61: Comparing IRFs: different covariances (1).
Annual deviations from steady state.
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Figure 62: Comparing IRFs: different covariances (2).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
98
Figure 63: Comparing IRFs: different covariances (3).
Annual deviations from steady state.
99
Figure 64: Comparing IRFs: different covariances (4).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 65: Comparing IRFs: different covariances (5).
Annual deviations from steady state.
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Figure 66: Comparing IRFs: different covariances (6).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper replicates the UIP puzzle by combining an EZ-BKK model with
exogenous fluctuations in convenience yields. Under a typical parametrization,
permanent shocks to bonds and a positive covariance between bond shocks and
long-run news shocks are needed to achieve this result. Under greater variance
for short-run shocks, the UIP puzzle is replicated without particular covariances.



























































2.6 Appendix B. IRFs for CCHH (2018).
2.6.1 Ea shock
Figure 67: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (1).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
112
















































Figure 68: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (2).


















































Figure 69: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (3).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 70: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (4).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 71: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (5).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 72: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (6).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 73: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (7).
















































Figure 74: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (8).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 75: IRFs for CCHH. Home short-run shock (9).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 76: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (1).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
121















































Figure 77: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (2).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
122














































Figure 78: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (3).
















































Figure 79: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (4).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 80: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (5).


















































Figure 81: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (6).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 82: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (7).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
127

















































Figure 83: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (8).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 84: IRFs for CCHH. Home long-run shock (9).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Appendix C. IRFs with temporary bond shocks.
2.6.3 Ea shock
Figure 85: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (1).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 86: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (2).

















































Figure 87: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary shocks. Home Short-run shock
(3).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
132















































Figure 88: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (4).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
133
















































Figure 89: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (5).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 90: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (6).



















































Figure 91: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (7).
















































Figure 92: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (8).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
137




























Figure 93: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Short-run
shock (9).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 94: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (1).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 95: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (2).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 96: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (3).

















































Figure 97: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (4).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 98: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (5).















































Figure 99: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (6).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 100: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (7).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 101: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (8).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 102: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (9).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 103: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Home Long-run
shock (10).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 104: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (1).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 105: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (2).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 106: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (3).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 107: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (4).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 108: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (5).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 109: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (6).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 110: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (7).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 111: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (8).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 112: IRFs for baseline model. Temporary bond shocks. Relative bond
shock (9).
Annual log deviations from steady state.
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3 Chapter 3. Populism, Financial Crises and
Banking Policies: Economics and Psychology
(joint with Donato Masciandaro)
3.1 Introduction
In light of the Great Depression, the Great Crisis and their aftermaths, the
emergence of populism in the wake of financial crises has taken the stage in
academic and public debates. Events - and descriptive analyses too, see Ap-
pendix One - seem to point to a link between financial crises on the one hand
and populist consensus on the other. As such, a question naturally arises: Do
the banking policies that the populist parties implement or suggest in the face
of such a crisis trigger or enhance the consensus on their relevance among citi-
zens?
The answer is far from obvious. For instance, the populist banking policies
introduced in response to the 2008-2009 bailout dilemma were quite heteroge-
neous, ranging from “no taxpayers’ money to banks” to “save banking deposits
whatever it takes”. In other words, a sort of “sight-unseen consensus” paradox
emerges in such situations. This calls for an investigation of the demand for
populism when the economic policy under discussion is a bank-bailout strategy
that leads politicians to intervene in some way, eventually resulting in a conflict
between traditional parties and new, radical political forces, such as populist
parties.
Our starting point is the extant literature on the political consequences of fi-
nancial crises (Funke et al. 2016, Mian et al. 2014, De Bromhead et al. 2018).
This literature sheds light on the nexus between these crises and their political
after-effects, and focuses on the fact that the citizens seem to be particularly at-
tracted to the political agenda of populist parties. In this perspective, populism
is a consequence of political and economic cycles (Guiso et al. 2017, Algan et
al. 2017, De Vries 2018, Di Tella and Rotemberg 2018, Mosimann et al. 2019).
Notably, this view can be considered together with two other general economic
explanations: populism caused by trade shocks (Autor et al. 2016, Colantone
and Stanig 2016) and populism caused by socio-economic inequalities (Good-
win and Heath 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Dorn et al. 2018, Bischi et al.
2020).
Other strands of literature are also useful for exploring the drivers of populism
and shedding light on the mechanisms through which individual decision mak-
ing is influenced by psychological factors (Nowakowski 2020). This research
pays particular attention to citizens’ groups. First, several papers recognize the
fact that populists use myopic, short-term solutions that benefit certain sub-
groups of the population. Such policies are often harmful in the long run (Sachs
1989, Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Acemoglu et al. 2013, Chersterley and
Roberti 2018). Second, empirical evidence supports the association between
wealth groups and populism. Moriconi et al. (2018) show that the inflow of less
educated immigrants is associated with an increase in votes that favour nation-
159
alistic positions and that this association is stronger for non-tertiary educated
voters. Giebler and Regel (2018) find that the “Poors” vote more for right-wing
populists, as these individuals are more likely to be unemployed and have less
education. Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, Bischi et al. (2020) show
that fear of immigration can drive people to support populism. Third, and more
generally, studies in social psychology underline that individual voting can be
affected by group affiliation through group norms, information and concepts of
identity (Tajfel 1982, Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, Gerber and Roger 2009).
Given the relationship between financial crises and populist consensus, a key
question emerges: Is there a role for the policies that the populist parties sug-
gest and/or implement in response to such crises? The answer is unclear. In
fact, evidence suggests that as the negative effects of financial crises are gen-
erally severe, politicians tend to intervene by changing the policy design (Saka
et al. 2020) and/or the corresponding institutional setting (Masciandaro and
Quintyn 2016). These actions are likely to be politically motivated (Dalla Pel-
legrina and Masciandaro 2008, Saka et al. 2020). Nevertheless, populist parties
adopt heterogeneous positions, especially with regard to the design of bailout
policies in the aftermath of financial turmoil. In some cases, they favour gen-
erous bailout policies – as in Poland in 2015; in other situations, they adopt
a position against the bailout solution proposed by the incumbent, traditional
parties – as in Italy in 2017 (for further details on these two opposite cases see
Appendix Two). With respect to the surge of populist parties on the right,
policy heterogeneity seems to characterize their socio-economic agendas during
elections (Roth et al. 2018).
Our paper aims to offer theoretical answers to the above questions by shedding
light on the links between specific populist banking policies and political con-
sensus, and by exploring the relevance of general economic and psychological
drivers. Our reasoning is as follows. Envision a country that is hit by a sys-
temic banking shock. In this country, a mainstream party and a populist party
are in electoral competition. The two parties propose different platforms to ad-
dress the crisis. The mainstream party is the classical centre-right or centre-left
party, and it follows moderate economic policies. The populist party pushes for
a sub-optimally high or low policy depending on its political positioning – what
matters is that those policies are not welfare maximizing.
The citizens decide which proposal they support by balancing the costs and ben-
efits of their choice both economically and psychologically. On the one hand,
the individual choice is heavily influenced by the respective wealth group. As
such, this is a behavioural decision – it is not only economic but also driven
by emotions. In this regard, what other group members do matters for the
individual. On the other hand, any wealth group has a reference point, which
depends on group information. Therefore, the wealth group’s reference point is
influenced by news about immigration, welfare plans, and housing plans. This,
in turn, generates “democratic rioting”. This mechanism moves the reference
point and generates fuel for the populist vote, and the political consensus on
specific bailout policies becomes dependent on a number of issues that have
nothing to do with the policies themselves. In other words, the consensus on
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specific banking policies becomes a general political manifestation of anger and
frustration.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents how the
economy works, including the different options in terms of policy design. Sec-
tion 3 describes how the political consensus on the banking policy depends on
both economic and psychological drivers. We offer our conclusions in Section 4.
3.2 Banking Crises and Populist Versus Mainstream Poli-
cies: Economics and Psychology
We assume, first, that populists enter the electoral competition by supporting
short-term rather than long-term policies. In order to highlight this special char-
acteristic of populist policies in our framework, we assume that populists want
a sub-optimal level of public bailout for banks in order to differentiate them-
selves from the optimal level proposed by the mainstream party. Our framework
allows for sub-optimally low or sub-optimally high bailout policies. Some pop-
ulist parties choose high public spending to reward specific social and economic
groups, and as a tool to address voters’ demands (Ahlquist et al. 2020). Other
populists fight the banks as part of the “corrupt” elite and may want to offer
them the lowest bailout possible.
Second, we assume that individuals who decide to vote for the populist party do
so by balancing the costs and benefits both economically and psychologically.
Individual choice is heavily influenced by the respective wealth group. Indeed,
we assume that the psychological benefits and individual costs of voting for
populists are different for poor and rich individuals. We model the psycholog-
ical benefit so that each citizen needs to be angry in order to perceive it and
it grows proportionally with that anger. Individuals are angry if they believe
they deserve more than they get on a welfare basis. This happens when policy
expectations are different from the group-specific reference point. Intuitively,
each group may perceive this to be true for a variety of reasons related to immi-
gration, unfair or absent welfare programs, or a lack of economic opportunities.
Notably, the causes of such a perception can be completely orthogonal to the
specific policy on which the individual will vote.
Third, we know that populists tend to blame economic and political elites. In
our framework, this means that the populist rhetoric incentivizes each person
in the two groups to consider that group’s features. For example, the poor may
represent the lower 70 % of the wealth distribution, while the rich are the elite
in terms of wealth. Our key assumption is that individual agents’ votes are
influenced by group behaviour from a psychological standpoint.
Our approach defines populist policies as short-term, suboptimal policies that
are driven by anti-elite (i.e. redistributive) motivations. This approach is based
on Golder (2016), who suggests that “the precise content of the populist message
is context-dependent” but it always goes against the established power struc-
tures, and on Guiso et al. (2017), who propose that the left or right orientation
of a populist party depends on the political opportunity space. Moreover, our
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approach is compatible with all types of non-mainstream parties (e.g. populists,
extremists, anti-system actors). This allows us to be as general as possible in
building a model that links populism with specific economic policies – in our
case, the orientation towards bank bailouts.
Our model builds a macroeconomic framework and a political economy decision
for the citizens of the economy. Within our macroeconomic framework, there
is an optimal bailout policy after the banking shock. Each citizen works the
same hours but has a different amount of wealth than she or he had in the past.
This implies that every citizen compares herself or himself to one of the two
wealth groups: rich and poor 22. The assigned group matters in terms of the
psychological benefit derived from voting for populists. In short, each citizen
has a probability of voting for the populists that depends on three features:
whether that citizen is angry with the mainstream party, whether that citizen
compares herself or himself to the rich or the poor, and the individual costs
of voting for the populists. Psychology drives the first two motivations, while
economics explains the third.
We assume that an aggregate negative banking shock generates a positive prob-
ability of voting for a populist party by acting on the demand for populism,
given a fixed supply of populism. A generic populist party offers an alternative
to a classical party that represents the optimal policy choice. Our approach
bridges a political economy framework and a macroeconomic framework – the
negative banking shock makes the government introduce a proportional tax to
fund the banking system’s bailout. The extent of the intervention is to be de-
cided through the electoral competition. We assume that this will be the only
policy dimension on which to vote (Persson and Tabellini 2002).
In this model, monetary and fiscal policy interact but voters only choose the
latter. This setup replicates a common institutional setting seen in the advanced
economies starting in the 1980s – a monetary dominance regime (Masciandaro
and Romelli 2015). In such a regime, monetary policy is in the hands of an
independent central bank, while the government controls fiscal policy.
3.2.1 Players
The economy consists of heterogenous agents: the government, the central bank
and the banking system (Masciandaro and Passarelli 2019) 23. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the population size is normalized to one, such that
total and per capita amounts are the same for all variables. Moreover, we as-
sume that there is only one representative bank in the economy24.
22In contrast to Masciandaro and Passarelli (2019), wealth composition does not matter
here.
23Alternatively, as in Gertler et al. (2017), we can assume that each household (family)
consists of a continuum of members who can be either workers or bankers. Workers supply
labour and earn wages for the household, while bankers manage a financially risky business
and transfer the relative earnings back to the household. The number of bankers in each
household is heterogeneous.
24This implies that all banks are homogeneous and that the macro-banking outcome is
simply the sum of micro-level optimizing behaviour.
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We take the bank profits as exogenous, thereby distinguishing between normal
times and extraordinary times. In normal times, the bank works properly – the
government does not need to issue debt and, consequently, there is no need to
introduce taxation to service such debt.
Extraordinary times come when a banking crisis occurs and the government is
forced to intervene. The fiscal policy design involves two decisions: one regard-
ing the bailout amount, and one regarding how to finance the bailout given the
central bank’s decisions in terms of fiscal monetization and the presence of a
monetary dominance regime. Consequently, the central bank’s choices will be
in line with its inflation goal.
The government introduces an income tax to repay debt and interest. The
citizens make decisions about labour and consumption given the tax policy.
The government’s choice of a bailout policy will reflect the trade-off between
minimizing tax distortions and smoothing out the monetary and financial ex-
ternalities that a bailout policy can trigger.
This is where the nature of the government in charge becomes relevant. In fact,
if the incumbent government chooses a sub-optimal bailout policy (i.e. a policy
that is different from the social planner optimization), that choice will decrease
welfare. For example, if the bailout rate is too high, the economy will likely
suffer an inflation cost (a monetary externality) and/or higher moral hazard
risks (a financial externality).
Finally we study the possibility of a populist consensus can strengthen a pop-
ulist government in charge, but it can also influence the choice of a traditional
incumbent government. Recently (Kishishita and Yamagishi 2021) it has been
explored the propagation of populist policies in different countries through an
external contagion channel, when an interaction between domestic and foreign
policies is active. Here we add the possibility of an internal contagion channel,
through the interaction between alternative domestic parties.
3.2.2 Policy design
The citizens are risk neutral, and they draw utility from consumption and disu-
tility from labour. They use their net labour income and their financial assets
to buy a single consumption good. We assume heterogeneity in the composition
of their portfolios, while labour income is the same for all individuals. These as-
sumptions enable us to zoom in on the macroeconomic consequences of financial
inequality, all else equal. Individual utility is linear 25:
c− U(l) (53)
The budget constraint of a citizen who owns an average portfolio is:
c = l∗(1− τ) + w + β(1 + λ)π(1 + i(1− δ)) (54)
25Linear utility helps us with a simpler solution at a low cost, as we do not model intertem-
poral consumption choice in this paper.
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where l∗ is the optimal labour supply, labour productivity is normalized to one
and l(1 − τ) is the after-tax (net) labor income. w is the average amount of
wealth in the economy.
U(l) is an increasing and convex effort function. After observing τ , each citizen
chooses how much to work to maximize (1). The optimality condition yields
the citizen’s labour-supply function:
L(τ) = U−1l (1− τ) (55)
L(τ) is decreasing in the tax rate: L(τ)τ < 0 . The optimal labour supply
depends on the specific functional form of U(l) , which depends on the selected
tax policy: l∗ = L(τ).
As labour is the only factor of production, the labour supply represents the total
income: y = L(τ) . Therefore, income and the labour supply in equilibrium will
depend on the tax policy.
In extraordinary times (i.e. when a banking crisis occurs), the government faces
a trade-off: let the bank fail or rescue it. In the latter case, the government
issues public debt for the same amount as the bailout, and sells it to either
citizens or the central bank. The government defines the bailout policy, β , such
that the saved amount is βπ(1+δ) . Note that the bailout policy determines how
painful the banking shock is for individuals. The government budget constraint
is:
β(1 + λ)π(1 + i(1− δ)) = τy (56)
where τ is the tax rate, y is the income of the citizens before taxes, i is the inter-
est paid on the government bonds, and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the central bank’s purchase,
which represent fiscal monetization. The interest rate on bonds is determined
according to a standard no-arbitrage condition with respect to a perfect, long-
term, risk-free interest rate. As usual, it is a parameter.
For any unit of debt issued, the government repays 1 + i(1 − δ) in the next
period. The cost of debt i(1− δ) is negatively associated with fiscal monetiza-
tion, as the more the central banker is conservative (i.e. low δ ) in a monetary
dominance setting, the smaller the portion of the debt purchased by the central
bank will be. The government fully internalizes the consequences of the mone-
tary dominance regime in defining the bailout policy,β , by considering the fiscal
monetization parameter. Therefore, the overall policy design is: τ = T (β, δ) .
Finally, we consider the macroeconomic relevance of both financial and mone-
tary externalities. The financial externalities depend on the bailout policy, β ,
and are increasing and convex in the amount of lost bank liabilities:
FE(β) ≡ ε
2
[(1− β)(1 + λ)π]2 (57)
Monetary externalities are assumed to increase with fiscal monetization:
ME(β, δ) ≡ ϕ
2
δ2β(1 + λ)π (58)
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In summary, citizens draw utility from consumption and disutility from
labour, financial and monetary externalities. These costs are spread equally
among citizens, so that the indirect utility function, V (β, δ) of a citizen with an
average portfolio is:
V (β, δ) = C(β, δ)− U(l∗)− FE(β)−ME(β, δ) (59)
We assume a generic probability distribution of wealth for the citizens. If the
bailout policy, β , is implemented, the value of the citizen’s average portfolio is
influenced as follows:
βπ(1 + λ) + β(1 + λ)π(1 + i(1− δ)) + w (60)
The first term is the value of the citizen bank share and bank deposits. The
second term is the interest payment on government bonds, while the third term
is the average wealth, w . Individual portfolios differ from the average portfolio.
We assume that the differences in individual portfolios reflect only differences
in the amount of initial wealth, wj , as we are only interested in dividing the
population into two broad groups (rich and poor). The bailout option and the
fiscal monetization influence both the average portfolio value and the individual
portfolio value through two channels: the value of the bank’s liabilities and the
interest payments on public bonds.
The choice of β determines how relevant the shock is for individuals. It is a de
facto wealth shock that affects the citizens (i.e. the voters). A higher bailout
rate implies not only a lower wealth shock for the citizens but also higher costs
of externalities.
The optimal policy is derived as follows. The social planner considers the re-
lation between the tax policy, τ = T (β, δ) , and the labour supply in order
to maximize the social-welfare function, V (β, δ) by choosing the policy strategy
regarding the banking policy, β∗ and the monetary policy δ∗ . Given the govern-
ment’s budget constraint (2) and the labour supply (3), the budget constraint
becomes:
β(1 + λ)π(1 + i(1− δ)) = τL(τ) (61)
This gives, in implicit form, the relationships between the tax policy on the
one hand and the bailout and fiscal monetization policies on the other hand. In
fact, by differentiating (9) and introducing the labour supply elasticity, n(τ) ≡
− τLτL to highlight the tax-distortion effect, we obtain:
Tβ =







According to equation 10, a higher bailout percentage implies a higher tax rate
owing to the larger amount of debt and interest. By the same reasoning, higher
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fiscal monetization reduces the tax rate (equation 11).
Using the social-welfare function of the citizens with average portfolios (8), the
two optimality conditions are:
Vβ = Cβ(β, δ)− FEβ(β)−MEβ(β, δ) ≤ 0 (64)
Vδ = Cδ(β, δ)−MEδ(β, δ) ≤ 0 (65)
where strict inequality implies the corner solution (i.e. β∗ = 0 or delta∗ = 0 ).
When setting the banking bailout policy, the social planner accepts a trade-off
between two public goals: externality smoothing and tax-distortion minimiza-
tion. The social planner solution becomes the benchmark for evaluating the
government’s actual choices. For example, if the bailout is too high, taxes are
high, thereby reducing the indirect utility. At the same time, financial and
monetary externalities grow significantly.
By solving the FOC system (12-13) and using (2, 6-7), we obtain the socially
optimal choices:















3.3 Consensus Mechanism: Democratic Rioting and Pop-
ulism
Now the bailout policies can be associated with political consensus by mimicking
a voting procedure (Masciandaro and Passarelli 2019). Citizens vote on the
proposals for different bailout percentages26. Every citizen, j, has an indirect
utility:
V j(β, δ) = V (β, δ) + wj − w (68)
which is given by the citizen with the average portfolio plus or minus his or her
individual wealth.
We assume that these differences matter only because they induce the creation
of two groups broadly defined by wealth: rich and poor. In other words, wealth
is the only feature that defines the group’s reference point for political issues.
Emotionally, the poor do not compare themselves with the elite or vice versa.
The citizens express their consensus by voting and there is only one policy
dimension on which to vote (Persson and Tabellini 2002)27. Voting on such
a decision is suitable for creating a public debate and channelling attention,
thereby cementing collective emotions around the issue. As we already men-
tioned, the monetary policy decision is made by an independent central bank
that chooses the optimal level of inflation defined by (15). We assume that there
is no strategic choice of δ in anticipation of the popular consensus. The central
bank addresses the banking crisis in a way that is consistent with its mandate.
The citizen is voting only on β . Thus, we use the notation V j(β) For simplicity,
agents in each group are assumed to have the same wealth among themselves,
which is lower for the poor agents:
V r(β) > V p(β)
The two group sizes are λr and λp , such that λr + λp = 1 and λr < λp . Now,
in order to highlight the specialness of the populist policy, we assume that the
mainstream party proposes the optimal bailout policy, β∗ , while the populists
prefer a bailout policy where β 6= β∗ . This assumption is coherent with the
populists presenting a different policy than the traditional parties, and it should
be modelled on the specific populist party and political system.
Citizens decide whether to vote for the populist party by balancing the economic
and psychological costs and benefits of this choice. The individual costs of voting
for the populists consist of a component common to all groups, µ > 0 , and a
group-specific random variable, εi,j with uniform distribution with a mean of
zero and a density of 12σi
28.
26In contrast to Masciandaro and Passarelli (2019), we do not use the median voter theorem,
as we are considering a framework for which a probability of voting for the populists emerges.
This framework will not deliver a clear winner in an electoral competition, but rather a proxy
of the support for populists.
27We can assume that the bailout decision is, by far, the most important political issue on
which the two parties compete.




The individual benefit of voting for populists comes from the expression of
emotions in a way that has a public impact. Importantly, the individual benefit
of voting for populists increases as the size of the individual’s group increases.
This is an indirect, public display of emotions. Therefore, the more it is shared
by group members, the more it pleases the individual. In the words of Passarelli
and Tabellini (2017), “the psychological benefit of a public display of anger is
stronger if the emotion is more widely shared” and is related to being treated
unfairly.
The individual benefit crucially depends on the presence of anger among citizens




max[0, Ri − V i(β)]2 (69)
V i(β) is the group’s indirect utility and Ri is the group’s reference point, which
defines what the group expects in term of indirect utility. For example, an in-
dividual who is part of the poor group is angry if ap > 0 . This happens only if
the poor expect a different indirect utility than the one they get.
In summary, individual j in group i votes for the populists if the benefits
are greater than the costs:
piλiai − µ− εij ≥ 0 (70)
If we assume a uniform distribution for εi,j , the probability of voting for a
populist party is:











For individual j in group i , the probability of voting for the populists is
higher when the individual cost of voting for the populists is lower, the anger of
group is higher and the variance in group-specific costs is lower. This formula
defines our model of consensus and highlights the importance of the psycholog-
ical drivers, all else equal. The equilibrium probabilities for both groups allow
for multiple equilibria: a suboptimal policy can be relevant (regardless of the
proposal) depending on which perceptions are in action, country by country and
period by period, given the economic features of the proposed policy.
The above link between consensus on the one side and economic and psycho-
logical drivers on the other allows us to analyse different political positions on
a bank-bailout policy.
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3.3.1 The Votes of the Poor and the Rich
Equation (20) describes support for populists in economies hit by banking
shocks. Individuals have a different probability of voting for populists depending
on their wealth group, which is assumed to be related to their economic costs
and the psychological benefit of voting fir populists. Two dimensions must be
taken into account: the individual costs of voting for populists, εi,j and anger,
ai .
Consider a scenario in which the poor have less variance in the individual costs
of voting populist (σp < σr) and the same anger as the rich (ap = ar > 0). This
assumes that the poor have more homogeneous costs relative to the rich. Intu-
itively, the rich may have more extreme individual costs (positive or negative)
of voting for populists. For example, a populist regime may choose a part of the
economic elite of a country to become even more powerful through government
backing in business ventures or it may crush the same ventures to capitalize on
a political opportunity.




grows with the group’s anger. More anger makes everyone in a wealth group
more willing to vote for the populists because the psychological benefits are
greater.
The poor have a higher probability of voting for the populists because the
smaller σi is, the bigger ∂p
i∗
∂ai is. The effect of anger on the probability is greater
when group i is more homogeneous.
Consider now a scenario in which the variance in the individual costs of voting
for populists are the same (σp = σr), while the levels of anger ai differ. Anger
emerges when the group’s reference point, Ri differs from the group’s indirect
utility:




max[0, Ri − V i(β)]2 > 0
The probability that individuals in group i will vote for the populists is greater
than zero.
Intuitively, anger may originate from different sources. For example, bias against
immigrants and ignorance of actual public finance decisions are more probable
among the poor than among the rich. Rp differs more with respect to indirect
utility than Rr does. Hence ap > ar , ceteris paribus.
In summary, both the rich and the poor may have probabilities of voting for the
populists that are greater than zero. For a single group to do so, that group’s
anger must be sufficiently large. For the sake of the following discussion, we
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will assume the more likely situation is the one in which the poor have a higher
probability of voting for populists because they have higher anger and lower
variance in the individual costs of voting populists.
This scenario seems to be more in line with the empirical evidence. Dorn et al.
(2018) show that poorer German counties in the period 1990-2014 had higher
shares of votes for extremist parties. Guiso et al. (2017) and Algan et al. (2017)
show that economic insecurity is a dominant driver of populist voting, which
is in line with the fact that the poor are much more likely to be affected by
economic hard times than the rich elite. Moreover, Funke et al. (2016) find
that there is a rise in extremist right-wing parties after a systemic banking
shock. In the same vein, De Bromhead et al. (2018) describe the emergence of
right-wing parties during the Great Depression.
3.3.2 Anger and Its Drivers
Anger arises from a difference between what the agents in a group think they
deserve, Ri , and what they get, V i(β) . This difference can be described as
part of the broad, socio-economic conditions of the two groups and their sense
of entitlements. In order to be specific and better understand the model, we
need to more accurately define Ri .
We assume that the reference point for individual j in group i is group specific:
Ri ≡ V i(β̂) (73)
β̂i is the subjective fair policy for group i and it is derived from a modified
social welfare optimization in which group i has a self-serving bias. This means
that the group sees itself as more deserving than the other group. Intuitively,
this is the bailout policy that group prefers.
Let us consider the case in which the populists claim a bailout policy higher
than the optimal policy through a self-serving bias that over-represents each of
the groups:





πii = λk(1 + vi) (76)
πik = λk(1− vi), i 6= k (77)
πii is the weight assigned by group i to itself, vi is the self-serving bias of group
i , and πik is the weight assigned by group i to group j . Intuitively, this means
that group i gives itself more social weight with respect to the other group29.
Why does a self-serving bias, vi , emerge? It is caused by shocks to the sense of
entitlement caused by news about immigration, welfare plans, or housing plans.
29It is worth noting that lower weights, πii and higher weights, πik will instead deliver a
reference point lower than the optimal. This is related to the case in which populists propose
a suboptimally low bailout rate.
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A group’s self-serving bias grows when its participants feel entitled to a better
public policy for various reasons, such as when they blame immigration or the
other group for getting too much public attention and resources. Self-serving
bias acts as a wedge between the indirect utility of voters and their reference
points.
Evidence indicates that a self-serving bias may be caused by immigration. Guiso
et al. (2017) find that hatred of immigrants affects voting decisions in favour of
populists. Dennison and Geddes (2018) find a correlation between the salience of
immigration (from the pan-European Eurobarometer survey) and the polling of
anti-immigration parties in most western European countries after 2005 (salience
is defined as the indication of the most important issue affecting the individuals
and/or the country).
Moriconi et al. (2018) find that inflows of less educated immigrants are positively
associated with increases in votes for nationalistic positions, and that this effect
is stronger among non-tertiary educated voters and in response to non-European
immigrants. Moreover, self-serving bias may be higher among poor people due
to their higher exposure to the presence of immigrants in public spaces (Card et
al., 2012). Through our lens, this means that inflows of less educated immigrants
increase the self-serving bias of both the rich and the poor, but with a stronger
effect on the poor, as these inflows cause greater aggrievement and lead to a
higher probability of voting for populists in this group.
3.3.3 Populist Threat Equilibrium
The possibility of a populist consensus can not only strengthen a populist gov-
ernment in charge but also influence the choice of a traditional incumbent gov-
ernment. We derive a new equilibrium probability, π̂i and show that it is a
function of the policy π̂i = P i(β̂) . We call this equilibrium the Populist Threat
Equilibrium (PTE), as it emerges from a government that considers the emer-
gence of the populist party as an alternative to the traditional one.
The government trades off the social-welfare effects of the policy against the





be the standard Benthamite social-welfare function. A benevolent social planner





where the general welfare loss increases as the number and size of groups voting










= P i(β) (81)
Specifically, if group i is angry, then:
P iβ(β) = −
λi
σi − µ
[P i(β)]2(Ri − V i(β))V iβ(β) (82)
P iβ(β) = −φi(β)V iβ(β)
Given the definition of ai , as the policy becomes more favourable to that group
(i.e. if V iβ(β) > 0 ), anger is reduced (−(Ri − V i(β))V iβ(β) < 0 ) as is the
probability of voting for the populists. Therefore, if the policy becomes more
favourable to an angry group, then P iβ(β) < 0 .
A Populist Threat Equilibrium (PTE) consists of a vector of subjectively fair
policies {β̂i} and corresponding reference utilities {Ri} , a vector of probabilities
of voting for the populists, p̂i and a policy, β̂ such that:





• Within each group i, all members optimally define a probability of voting
for the populists given the equilibrium policy, β̂ , the group’s reference
utility, {Ri} , and the equilibrium participation of the other group’s mem-
bers, pi∗ ;
• The government’s policy maximizes the social-welfare function inclusive
of the cost of voting for the populists (29), taking as a given the groups’
reference utilities {Ri} and given how the policy affects equilibrium par-
ticipation through (32).




λiP iβ(β) = 0 (83)
A benevolent government trades off the direct welfare effects of the policy, Wβ(β)
, against the disruptions caused by the populist vote. Given (30) and (31), the
optimality condition can be rewritten as:
2∑
i=1
λi[1 + Φi(β)]V iβ(β) = 0 (84)
where Φi(β) > 0 if ai > 0 , and zero otherwise. Equation (32) provides the full
characterization of the equilibrium policy, β̂ .
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All in all, a PTE policy solves a modified social planner problem in which
each group i receives the extra weight Φi(]hatβ) ≥ 0 . If the extra weight
differs between the rich and the poor, then there is a suboptimal choice of β̂ .
Moreover, only aggrieved groups get extra weight in the welfare function – they
exert some influence over policy.
More generally, a group’s political influence reflects the following features. First,
more homogeneous (low σi ) and larger (high λi ) groups are more influential
in voting for populists. Second, a more pronounced self-serving bias (high vi)
implies that group members become angry more easily and, hence, are more
prone to vote for populists.
3.3.4 Banking Recessions and Populist Consensus
Finally, our framework makes it possible to compare banking recessions and
normal recessions. In order to do so, we start with the extant literature on
the specialness of banking (financial, balance sheet, bubbly) recessions (Jorda
et al. 2015). The main results of this research can be summarized as follows:
all recessions are not created equal: the post-recession losses (PRL) are not
random; and the PRL are more prolonged and painful with a financial crisis
(PRFC) as the driver, while the PRFC is more prolonged and painful with a
credit boom as the driver.
Therefore, we assume that a financial recession has a stronger impact on the
banking system. We define β̂ = β(1−F ) , where F is a positive wedge between
financial and normal recessions. This setup means that a financial recession
creates a stronger shock to the banking system, all else equal.




max[0, Ri − V i(β̂)]2
We know that aiβ < a
i
β̂
for i = rich, poor. Intuitively, both the rich and the poor
are angrier during a financial recession than a normal recession. This outcome is
consistent with Funke et al.’s (2016) results indicating that financial recessions
lead to greater consensus regarding extreme parties than normal recessions.
3.4 Conclusion
Populism can have plenty of general economic and psychological explanations,
including cyclical recessions and unemployment, trade shocks, hatred of immi-
grants, and demand for redistribution. In this paper, we highlighted another
potential channel: the general motivations mentioned above can lead citizens to
start a democratic riot by supporting the banking policies that populist parties
propose for a bailout intervention after a systemic banking crisis.
The consensus decision is influenced by the citizens’ wealth group and it is gen-
uinely behavioural. Therefore, the public support for bailout policies becomes
highly dependent on a number of different motivations that have nothing to do
with the bailout policies as such. The democratic riot channel can explain the
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sight-unseen consensus in favour of populist banking policies, which are far from
homogeneous.
This analysis can be further enriched in several directions:
a) Monetary-stability risks and citizen heterogeneity. Monetary instability is
widely assumed to be a social cost that is borne equally by all individuals. If
we were to associate monetary instability with specific idiosyncratic risks, we
would assume that citizens can be also heterogeneous in their ability to address
such risks through hedging, with some individuals bearing – or feeling that they
bear – higher costs due to monetary instability (i.e. inflation-adverse citizens).
Allowing for this kind of heterogeneity could lead to further differentiation be-
tween traditional and populist parties.
b) Income and citizen heterogeneity. Labour income is assumed to be the same
for all individuals. In the presence of income heterogeneity, the distributional
effects are likely to increase. Moreover, income heterogeneity can be correlated
with other forms of asset heterogeneity. This can lead to additional interesting
trade-offs.
c) Public debt, tax pressure and interest rates. In the focal context, govern-
ment debt is only issued to address the pandemic-related recession, taxes are
only raised to service that debt and the interest-rate is consistent with the
long-term, risk-free interest rate. These are three simplifying assumptions. The
insertion of initial taxation and initial debt into the framework would increase
its complexity but probably not have substantial consequences for the overall
rationale. In contrast, interest-rate endogeneity that depends on the stock of
debt is likely to exacerbate the policy trade-offs and, consequently, the relevance
of the political distortions.
d) Traditional parties. The traditional party’s behaviour is assumed to be per-
fectly consistent with socially optimal planning. This assumption has been used
to disentangle the differences between traditional parties and populist parties
in the clearest way. However, we also discussed the possibility of a populist
consensus that could influence the choice of a traditional incumbent govern-
ment. In this perspective, the possibility of competitive, suboptimal policies
between traditional and populist parties can lead to other intriguing trade-offs.
Among these trade-offs, in principle we can include the possibility to consider
the interactions between domestic traditional parties, domestic populist parties
and foreign populist parties, mixing what we defined the internal and external
channels of populist contagion.
e) Central bank and monetary policy. The central bank regime and the mone-
tary policy are assumed to be perfectly consistent with socially optimal planning.
We also assume that all parties – including the populist parties – do not dis-
cuss these features. This assumption can be modified in two ways. On the one
hand, some researchers argue that the rise of populism may harm the consensus
in favour of central bank independence and monetary policies consistent with
such a regime (De Haan and Eijffinger 2017, Goodhart and Lastra 2017, Rajan
2017, Rodrik 2018). From an empirical point of view, the relationship between
one aspect commonly attributed to populism – namely, nationalism – and cen-
tral bank independence has been empirically examined (Agur, 2018), while the
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relationships between both right- and left-leaning populism and central bank
independence have been discussed from a theoretical perspective (Masciandaro
and Passarelli 2019). On the other hand, it is natural to wonder whether cases
of political and/or bureaucratic capture could trigger deviations in the concrete
monetary policy action from the (supposed) long-sighted perspective, such as
those documented in the historical case of political pressure for partisan mone-
tary policies (Abrams 2006).
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Appendix 1. The Relationship between Financial Imbal-
ances and Votes for Populist Parties: Some Descriptive
Analyses
Here we analyse the relationship between financial variables and political out-
comes in order to descriptively assess whether imbalances in financial and bank-
ing industries has been correlated with voters’ behaviour during elections.
We use data related to political outcomes from the Timbro Authoritarian Pop-
ulism Index (TAP), an initiative run by the free-market think tank Timbro.
We consider the share of votes for populist parties during every election from
2010 to 2019. The index reports for each year the shares of votes for populist
parties in the previous election. The dataset contains longer series, but we are
constrained by the availability of financial data. The index heavily relies on
secondary sources30 and, to the greatest extent possible, it follows typical and
existing categorizations. In general, it is not as difficult to categorize political
parties as one might expect. Despite some disagreement on labels, there is a
general consensus among scholars in this regard.
We retrieved financial data from the International Monetary Fund’s Financial
Soundness Indicator. Specifically, we rely on three variables: regulatory capital
to risk-weighted assets, star non-performing loans (NPLs) net of provisions to
capital, and NPLs to total gross loans. We chose these variables because, when
considering the economy as a whole, capital- and asset-related variables may
serve as proxies for financial soundness, while NPLs may serve as a proxy for
financial imbalances or turmoil. On the one hand, higher regulatory capital
and assets would allow firms to better absorb negative financial shocks, thereby
limiting spillovers to the financial and/or banking system. On the other hand,
larger shares of NPLs weaken firms’ abilities to absorb such negative shocks,
thereby leading to bankruptcies, losses for banks and, eventually, to financial
crisis. Therefore, as our theoretical model starts from the assumption that fi-
nancial and banking imbalances increase the share of votes for populist parties,
we expect a negative correlation between capital- and asset-related variables
and shares of votes for populist parties, and a positive correlation between the
NPL variables and shares of votes for populist parties.
Figures 1 shows the relationships between regulatory capital to risk-weighted as-
sets and the shares of votes for populist parties in elections in several European
countries and the UK. We also plot fitted values and the 95 % confidence inter-
val. The analysis shows a negative correlation between the proxy for financial
stability and the shares of votes for populist parties. Therefore this descriptive
evidence is in line with the assumption that financial imbalances and the rise of
populist parties are associated. Figures 2 and 3 show the positive relationship
30These sources include scholarly literature on the European party system; ideological labels
from internet sources, such as parties-and-elections.eu and Wikipedia; and the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (CHES), a quantitative summary of where parties belong on the left-to-right
spectrum combined with additional dimensions that serve to identify right-wing populists
(but not left-wing populists) using, for instance, views on minority rights, immigration and
multiculturalism.
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between NPLs and shares of votes for populists. Being NPLs a standard met-
rics for financial imbalances, also this evidence is consistent with the view that
financial instability and consensus for populist parties are associated.
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Note: for the sake of completeness, we checked the same associations chang-
ing the definitions of the relevant variables (see below): financial imbalances
and populist consensus follow to go hand in hand.
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3.4.1 All available years (2012/2019)
Figure 113: Correlation between shares for populists and current regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets.
Figure 114: Correlation between shares for populists and lagged regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets.
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Figure 115: Correlation between shares for populists and current log of NPL
net of provision to capital.
Figure 116: Correlation between shares for populists and lagged log of NPL net
of provision to capital.
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Figure 117: Correlation between shares for populists and current NPL to total
gross loans.
Figure 118: Correlation between shares for populists and lagged NPL to total
gross loans.
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3.4.2 Only election years
Figure 119: Correlation between shares for populists and current regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets.
Figure 120: Correlation between shares for populists and current log of NPL
net of provision to capital.
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Figure 121: Correlation between shares for populists and current NPL to total
gross loans.
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Appendix 2. Populism and banking policies: Poland vs
Italy
In this appendix, we consider two examples of how populist parties took advan-
tage of popular anger originating from banking crises and used it for their own
propaganda. Specifically, we first consider the 2015 Swiss franc (CHF) revalua-
tion in Poland. Thereafter, we shed light on how the Five Star Movement (the
main Italian populist party) first opposed the banking bailouts of the banche
venete when it was part of the opposition, and then approved interventions to
save Carige Bank and the Popular Bank of Bari in 2019 when it was part of the
government.
Poland
On January 15, 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) suspended its exchange
rate floor of 1.20 EUR/CHF and allowed the CHF to appreciate. The move
came in response to strong exchange-market pressure on the CHF and growing
domestic criticism of the peg. The SNB’s announcement caught financial-market
participants and policy makers in Switzerland and abroad by surprise. In the
initial hours following the decision, the exchange rate became so volatile that
Swiss banks temporarily stopped converting CHF into EUR. Several major cur-
rency brokers incurred huge losses and some went bankrupt.
Immediately after the CHF shock, Poland saw some scattered protests among
CHF borrowers. Nonetheless, the centre-right coalition government was initially
reluctant to offer any meaningful support for CHF borrowers. The issue gained
momentum during the May 2015 presidential campaign. In August 2015, dur-
ing the summer campaign season for the October elections, the PO (the ruling
party) introduced a bill that offered to the Polish households in smaller homes
the opportunity to convert their CHF mortgages into loans denominated in Pol-
ish zloty (PLN). The bill proposed that the resulting adjustment costs would
be shared roughly equally between borrowers and lenders.
The main opposition parties, the PiS and the Democratic Left Alliance, re-
sponded by proposing a more generous conversion scheme. They presented an
amended bill in parliament that broadened eligibility for loan conversion and
significantly increased the costs for banks. The incumbent PO lost the October
25, 2015, election by a wide margin, and its vote share fell by 15 percentage
points from the 2011 elections. The PiS rose to power with 38 % of the popular
vote (an increase of 8 percentage points relative to 2011).
Alquist, Copelovitch and Walter (2020) use a survey undertaken before the 2015
elections and an innovative research design to show that political parties can
exploit external economic shocks, that voters form preferences based on the par-
ties’ policy promises and that these preferences translate into voting behaviour.
Polish voters repaying CHF-denominated loans were directly exposed to the
CHF shock, favoured generous bailout policies and were more likely to switch
their votes to the opposition party that offered such policies (i.e. the PiS). This
stood in contrast to the policy preferences of a demographically similar group
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(i.e. those who no longer had CHF-denominated loans), who were far less sup-
portive of government intervention. Those without any exposure to currency
borrowing were less likely to have an opinion and less supportive of govern-
ment intervention. Nevertheless, using simple information experiments, these
researchers found that voters’ opinions were malleable at the margin in ways
that increased support for pro-borrower intervention. Among the unexposed,
those supporting the most government intervention also tended to support the
populist-right PiS and hold more anti-immigrant views.
Italy: The case of the Five Star Movement
The Five Star Movement, an anti-establishment party in Italy, consistently crit-
icized bank bailouts carried out by governments led by the Democratic Party
(PD) and used this issue as a main point in its agenda. In 2016, the government
bailed out the Monte dei Paschi di Siena bank. Luigi di Maio, the leader of
the movement and Italy’s foreign minister, criticized the decision, claiming that
the movement would have never spent public funds to save banks. In 2017, for-
mer minister Barbara Lezzi led other members of parliament in throwing false
banknotes during the approval of a law allocating EUR 4.7 billion to save two
Venetian banks (Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca) and to avoid
bail-in. They claimed that taxpayers’ money should not be spent to save banks
and accused the ruling PD of colluding with the financial establishment. More-
over, the government’s decision saved depositors and holders of senior bonds,
while junior holders were penalized. Although this difference was the result of
the nature of the specific bonds, many party members exploited it by claiming
that the government had penalized citizens in favour of the establishment.
The movement’s approach to bank crises changed drastically when, in March
2018, the party won the election (although did not have a majority) and formed
a government in coalition with the right-wing sovereign party “Lega”. In 2019,
this “yellow-green” government saved the commercial Carige Bank by collater-
alizing bonds for EUR 300 million. It also ring-fenced EUR 1 billion to cover
potential future capital injections. The government justified this decision by
saying that it was necessary to guarantee the daily functioning of the bank and,
therefore, to protect thousands of depositors and creditors.
When confronted with the fact that it had implement the same policies as pre-
vious governments, the party claimed that the goals were completely different.
According to party members, the government led by the PD saved Venetian
bankers while shareholders and holders of junior bonds lost all of their funds.
In contrast, the party claimed, the government had safeguarded citizens’ savings
in the Carige Bank case.
When the Popular Bank of Bari experienced financial turmoil in 2019, the party
cooperated with the PD to introduce measures to save the bank and avoid a
bail-in. Some analysts believe that this decision was necessary for the party, as
the Apulia region, where the bank was headquartered, was home to an impor-
tant electoral constituency for the movement. The government decided to invest
around EUR 1.5 billion using two government-controlled public companies that
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took control of the bank. In addition, another public company bought EUR 2
billion in NPLs for EUR 500 million.
When the party explained this decision on its blog, it highlighted that the deci-
sion would have the following effects: honest citizens would be saved; no mercy
would be given to the managers responsible for the bankruptcy; Italy would have
a public investment bank, thereby aligning itself with other European countries;
the government would encourage the Bank of Italy to prosecute the managers
responsible; and the government would ask the parliamentary commission re-
sponsible for banks to share the full names of the debtors responsible for the
bankruptcy. These claims reveal the populist and anti-establishment nature of
the movement. Although the party explained the reasons for its decisions and
claimed that the way it saved the banks in turmoil differed from the methods
used by previous governments, the tools it used and the effects were in line with
those of previous governments.
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